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Abstract of the thesis
Chapter 1 presents the background to the development of macroeconomic 
models with "menu costs", i.e., the costs of adjusting nominal prices. The debate on 
microeconomic foundations of macroeconomics is introduced in Section 1. The 
theoretical basis of the «classical dichotomy» between real and nominal variables and 
the role of nominal imperfection for the failure of such dichotomy are briefly 
surveyed in Section 2 and 3, respectively. The "monetary illusion" assumption and 
its limits are presented in Section 4. An account of some potential sources of nominal 
imperfections concludes the chapter.
Chapter 2 deals with the New Keynesian microeconomic foundations of 
nominal rigidity. Section 1 introduces the key elements of New Keynesian 
microfoundations. In Section 2, the seminal 1985 paper by Mankiw is examined in 
some detail. It wül be shown that small menu costs can cause "monetary" business 
cycles to have large welfare effects. The role of real rigidities in explaining nominal 
price stickiness is addressed in Section 3. The remaining part of the chapter focuses 
on dynamic models of menu costs.
Chapter 3 gives a quick overview of microeconomic studies on costly price 
adjustment. Section 1 outlines Barro (1972) and Sheshinski and Weiss (1977), where a 
monopoly optimal pricing policy is derived. In Section (2), an overview of recent 
game-theoretic frameworks with menu costs is given. It will be argued that these 
models fail to capture the theoretical essence of menu costs. The last part of the 
chapter deals with the issue of the empirical relevance of costly price adjustments.
Chapter 4 presents a theoretical study that can contribute to shed light into 
menu costs within a game-theoretic setting. Section 1 introduces the issue. In Section 
2, a Bertrand duopoly model with menu costs is set up in order to derive the 
duopolists' best response to a nominal shock. The main findings are expounded in 
Section 3. A duopoly nominal price adjustment rule will be derived. This turns out to 
be contingent to the sign of the nominal shock. Situations of multiple equilibria, both 
symmetric and asymmetric, can also arise.
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Introduction
Introduction
The existence of some type of nominal frictions within a free-market economy, where 
economic agents behave rationally and money is used as medium of exchange, 
represents a theoretical justification for explaining why the fictitious Walrasian 
auctioneer may not be able to ensure a stable full-employment equilibrium. Over the 
1980s, these nominal frictions have taken the form of costly nominal price 
adjustments. Purpose of this thesis is to survey both the macroeconomic as well as 
the microeconomic literature concerning the costs of adjusting nominal prices. 
Moreover, it aims to shed some light on how the implications of the existence of 
costly nominal price adjustments can be affected by different type of market 
structures, notably by a strategically-interactive setting.
The thesis is organised as follows.
Chapter 1 presents the background to the development (over the 1980s) of 
macroeconomic models with "menu costs", i.e., the costs of adjusting nomilial prices. 
The debate on microeconomic foundations of macroeconomics, most notably of the 
real effects of money, is introduced in Section 1. The theoretical basis of the "classical 
dichotomy" between real and nominal variables is briefly surveyed in Section 2. It 
will be shown that within the neoclassical framework money turns out to be 
effectless (i.e., neutral) on real magnitudes. Section 3 deals with the conditions 
needed for the classical dichotomy to fail. Specifically, the role of nominal 
imperfections will be outlined. The "monetary illusion" assumption and its limits are 
presented in Section 4, An account of some potential sources of nominal 
imperfections concludes the chapter. Section 5 deals with imperfect information 
regarding prices. This leads to money misperception and, consequently, to money 
non-neutrality. Section 6 focuses on nominal friction in the form of long-term 
contracts that causes nominal wages to be rigid.
Chapter 2 deals with the New Keynesian microeconomic foundations of 
nominal rigidity. Specifically, it will be shown how nominal price inertia can be 
derived from individual optimising behaviour. Section 1 briefly introduces the key 
elements of New Keynesian microfoundations, namely (i) imperfectly competitive
m
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goods markets, (ii) small nominal friction, and (iii) some type of real rigidities. In 
Section 2, the seminal 1985 paper by Mankiw is examined in some detail. It will be 
shown that small menu costs, in principle, can cause "monetary" business cycles to 
have large welfare effects. The role of real rigidities in explaining nominal price 
stickiness is addressed in Section 3, where a short account of Ball and Romer (1989, 
1990) win be given. Because of real rigidity, multiple symmetric equilibria in nominal 
price adjustments can also arise. In Section 4 ,1 shall briefly consider the issue of price 
indexation. The remaining part of the chapter focuses on dynamic models of menu 
costs. In Section 5, the main features of time-dependent and state-dependent pricing 
rules are surveyed. Section 6 outlines the Caplin and Spulber 1987 model and its 
main implications.
Chapter 3 gives a quick overview of microeconomic studies on costly price 
adjustment. Most of them focus either on monopoly or on monopolistic competition. 
Attempts to analyse menu costs within a strategically interactive setting are rare 
indeed and typically consider real rather than nominal shocks. Section 1 outlines 
Barro (1972) and Sheshinski and Weiss (1977). It wiU be shown that the optimal 
pricing policy for a monopolist faced with costly price adjustments and a 
continuously increasing rate of inflation takes the form of an {S s^) rule. In Section (2), 
an overview of recent game-theoretic frameworks with menu costs is given. It will be 
argued that these models fail to capture the theoretical essence of menu costs. The 
last part of the chapter deals with the issue of the empirical relevance of costly price 
adjustments.
Chapter 4 presents a theoretical study that can contribute to shed light into 
menu costs within a game-theoretic setting. Section 1 briefly introduces the issue. In 
Section 2, a Bertrand duopoly model with menu costs is set up in order to derive the 
duopolists' best response to a nominal shock. To start with, a generic demand 
structure for each duopolist is considered (Section 2.1). It will be shown that firm- 
specific nominal price rigidity can occur even when menu costs are set equal to zero. 
A specific functional form is chosen in Section 2.2. The main findings are expounded 
in Section 3 where the cases of zero and of strictly positive menu costs are in turn
IV
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outlined (Section 3.1 and 3.2, respectively). A duopoly nominal price adjustment rule 
will be derived. This turns out to be asymmetric, i.e., contingent to the sign of the 
nominal shock. Situations of multiple equilibria, both symmetric and asymmetric, 
can also arise.
M oney non-neutrality and microeconomic principles
CHAPTER!:
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Chapter 1: M oney non-neutrality and microeconomic principles 
Money non-neutrality and microeconomic principles
This chapter presents the background to the development (over the 1980s) of 
macroeconomic models with "menu costs", i.e., the costs of adjusting nominal prices.
The debate on microeconomic foundations of macroeconomics, most notably of the 
real effects of money, is introduced in Section 1. The theoretical basis of the "classical 
dichotomy" between real and nominal variables is briefly surveyed in Section 2. It 
win be shown that within the neoclassical framework money turns out to be 
effectless (i.e., neutral) on real magnitudes. Section 3 deals with the conditions 
needed for the classical dichotomy to fail. Specifically, the role of nominal 
imperfections will be outlined. The "monetary illusion" assumption and its limits are 
presented in Section 4. An account of some potential sources of nominal 
imperfections concludes the chapter. Section 5 deals with imperfect information 
regarding prices. This leads to money misperception and, consequently, to money 
non-neutrality. Section 6 focuses on nominal friction in the form of long-term 
contracts that causes nominal wages to be rigid.
1. Introduction
The role of money within the market economy is a long-disputed issue in 
economics^. The matter of controversy is, precisely, whether or not monetary, i.e., 
nominal, changes can affect real magnitudes such as output and employment. If so, 
money is said to be non-neutral. Otherwise, it is qualified as neutral. In this latter 
case, changes in the money stock affect only nominal variables and a dichotomy (the 
so-called classical dichotomy) between the real and the nominal side of the economy J
emerges. !
At least since World War II the debate on the sensitivity of real variables to monetary 
changes has become relevant to the research on economic fluctuations^. In particular, Î4
1 Money was an object of dispute well prior to the publication of J.M. Keynes' 1936 book The General 
Theory o£Employment Interest and M oney For a brief and enjoyable historical account see Galbraith 
(1987), Chapter IZ
2 See McCallum (1988), where post-war developments in business cycle theories are surveyed. For 
surveys on business cycles theories see also Gordon (1981,1990), McCaUum (1986), Silvestre (1993).
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the non-neutrality of money is at the heart of a class of business cycle models that 
account for the observed macroeconomic fluctuations as the result of exogenous^ 
demand shocks (typically, monetary shocks). Hence the label of Monetary Business 
Cycle (MBC) models^. This class of models embraces both the theoretical 
contributions by Keynesian^ or non-market-clearing macroeconomists, as well as the 
theoretical contributions by New Classical or equilibrium macroeconomists of the 
"First Generation"^. In passing, the non-neutrality of money (in the short term) is the 
only common feature shared by the two competing schools of macroeconomic 
thought^
According to MBC theorists, economic fluctuations are (mainly) demand-driven. 
Specifically, aggregate supply (AS) deviates from its natural, i.e., trend, growth rate 
primarily because of exogenous disturbances affecting the nominal aggregate 
demand (AD)^. Such disturbances are usually taken to be of monetary nature^. Since
3 The volatility of output and mnployment is commonly explained as the result of shocks that are 
exogenous to the economic system. There are, indeed, alternative business cycle models where 
disturbances are taken as endogenous. For an empirical evaluation of the currently prevalent models 
of exogenously-driven economic business cycles see Cochrane (1994). References on alternative 
theories with endogenous shocks, can be found therein.
4 This label is used to emphasise the contrast with Real Business Cycle (RBC) models, where money is 
neutral and economic fluctuations are initiated by real rather than nominal shocks. These shocks 
typically affect technology. According to RBC economists, the main source of output volatility is 
located in the supply side of the economy. In a fairly rough fashion, RBC theories can be qualified as 
theories of supply-driven fluctuations. While MBC theories as theories of demand-driven fluctuations. 
RBC modds are surveyed in McCallum (1989), and Plosser (1989). For an evaluation of RBC models 
from a «New Keynesian perspective» see Mankiw (1989).
5 By Keynesian macroeconomics I mean that group of theories urging stabilisation policy. As the self- 
equilibrating market mechanism is subject to failures, policy-makers' intervention is highly 
recommended to ensure stable growth.
 ^The "First Generation" title aims to distinguish the 1970s equilibrium approach to the analysis of 
macroeconomic fluctuations from its later variant, namely the RBC approach, which R.J. Barro 
qualified as «Second Generation of New Classical macroeconomics». See Barro (1989), where the main 
departures of the Second Generation from the early New Classical macroeconomics are outlined.
7 See McCallum (1988), p. 459.
8 By nominal aggregate demand it is meant the schedule in the price -  real income plane derived from 
the Hicksian IS-LM curves. SpedficaUy, it represents the locus of intersection points of the IS-LM 
curves at different price levels. See Stevenson e t al. (1988), Chapter 1 and 7, for details on the 
aggregate demand.
9 An exogenous nominal shock can be any disturbance affecting one (or more) of the AD exogenous 
components (money supply, government expenditure, net exports). Yet^  much of the research has 
focused on disturbances to the money supply. As pointed out by Blanchard (1990), «[t]his is not 
because money is the major source of movements in output Rather, it is because economic theory 
does not lead us to expect such effects». See Blanchard (1990), p. 780; see also Blanchard and Fischer 
(1989), p. 376 (footnote 9).
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shocks (are expected to) enter into and propagate across the economy through the 
nominal AD, causality runs from AD, which is exogenously determined, to AS^°. 
MBC macroeconomists' analysis is therefore focused on the determinants of the AS, 
notably on the behaviour of prices. As it wiH become clear soon, it is price behaviour 
that matters in establishing wheiher money is neutral or not.
Although the controversy on money and, accordingly, on the main source of 
business cycles involves both theory and facts, I shall concentrate only on the former, 
leaving the empirical quarrel aside^^. Scope of the chapter is to introduce the 
theoretical conundrum of explaining money non-neutrality in terms of choices made 
by rational, i.e., objective maximising, decision makers^^. As clearly pointed out by 
Andersen (1994), «[t]he reason for stressing the need to base models on optimizing 
agents is to impose the discipline that explanations should be consistent with 
systematic behaviour». Any economic phenomenon can be justified by coincidences 
or rules of thumb. No doubt, however, that if it can be effectively described «as the 
result of systematic behaviour driven by economic incentives», we will have «a more 
robust explanation and the possibility of analysing how this behaviour is influenced 
by change in the environment, ...»^ .^
Before concluding this introduction, it is worthwhile to emphasise that any attempt 
of providing microeconomic foundations to macroeconomics (in the sense given 
above) implicitly assumes that aggregates obey microeconomic principles. Thus, the 
behaviour of economy as a whole can alw ays be weU approximated by aggregating 
across individual behaviours. According to this approach, which appears to have 
been dominant in the development of macroeconomics over the last three decades.
20 The possible channels of feedback from prices to nominal AD (e.g., the real balance effect or the 
intertemporal substitution of consumption due to expectations on inflation) are ignored, since they are 
of secondary importance with respect to the matter I am dealing with
21 The most striking fact that seems to be against the (short-term) neutrality of money is the observed 
«Output-Inflation Trade-off». That is, the Phillips curve-type rdation between output (employment) 
and inflation. Those who, nowadays, advocate the idea of money neutrality, namely the RBC theorists, 
resort to the "reverse causation" to justify the trade-off. It is not money that causes output to vary, but 
vice versa. See, among others, Barro (1989).
22 For details on the debate on the microeconomic foundations of macroeconomics see Mankiw (1990), 
Blanchard (1990), Romer (1996), Chapter 6. An interesting methodological appraisal of the attempts to 
underpin «descriptive macroeconomics» with microeconomic, ie., theoretical, foundations is provided 
by Janssen (1991). An interesting reading is also Lucas (1977).
Chapter 1: M oney non-neutrality and microeconomic principles
any explanation of macroeconomic events that fails to fit the objective-maximising 
postulate must be dismissed because of its alleged inconsistency with microeconomic 
principles^ Quoting J. Tobin, «[mjany contemporary theorists cannot believe any 
theory that implies socially irrational market failures. They suspect that individual 
irrationalities are lurking somewhere in the theory»^®.
2. The neoclassical paradigm and the neutrality of money
The advocates of the neutrality of money can rely on a well established theoretical 
apparatus; namely the internally consistent paradigm that formalises the neoclassical 
idea of how the free-market economic system works. In a world where economic 
agents are supposed to be fuUy rational and informed and prices fully flexible, 
money turns out to be (approximately) neutraP^.
Rationality and perfect information ensure that individuals do not forego any 
perceived gain from trade. Price flexibility guarantees that all markets clear a t any 
time: as soon as demand and supply differ, the relevant prices promptly adjust as to 
restore the identity. Such self-equilibrating market mechanism is known as the "Law 
of Supply and Demand". The behaviour of the economy as a whole is derived by 
aggregating across markets and microeconomic units, i.e., individuals and firms. As 
the market-clearance condition is continuously and everywhere met, the economy is 
(expected to be) always at its full employment equilibrium. That is, there are no idle 
resources that could be somehow activated. In particular, the labour market-clearing 
level of employment determines the level of aggregate output, AS. Whereas total 
expenditure, i.e., nominal AD, passively follows suit as predicted by the Say^s Law^L
23 See Andersen (1994), p. 7.
24 In general, any explanation of economic facts that clashes with the postulate of optimising 
behaviour undermines the aspiration of making economics a body of analytical tools as internally 
consistent as possible. G.A. Akerlof and J.L. Yellen, among others, raise however some doubts on this 
«esthetic» aspiration. See Akerlof and Yellen (1987), p. 137.
25 See Tobin (1993), p. 47. See also Janssen (19%), p. 619.
26 In RJ. Barro's words «the neoclassical framework [...] has a strong tendency to generate a close 
approximation to monetary neutrality». See Barro (1989), p. 2, and Blanchard (1990), p. 780. For a 
detailed justification for why money can have real, if marginal, effects also within the neoclassical 
framework see Stevenson et al. (1988), pp. 35-8.
27 According to Say's law, supply creates its own demand, ie ., «the overall activity of production 
generates purchasing power (distributes real income) which is inevitably spent in buying the real
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Since resources are fully employed (vertical AS), movements in AD in  no way can 
affect the aggregate level of output
Figure 1, where the AS schedule is plotted in the price - output plane, captures the 
key features of the neoclassical macromodeF^. As pointed out, real variables remain 
unaffected by nominal movements. Any change in the money stock (represented in 
Figure 1 by a shift of AD, from ADi to ADz) only produces a proportional chaiige in 
the general price level, P, leaving the fuU-employment equilibrium level of aggregate 
income, y*, fixed.
FIGURE 1 (at the end of the chapter).
3. Nominal imperfections and money non-neutrality
It is often argued that «[a]ny microeconomic basis for failure of the classical 
dichotomy requires some kind of nominal imperfection; otherwise, a purely nominal 
disturbance leaves the real equilibrium (or the set of real equilibria) unchanged»^^. 
This argument is based on the property of zero-degree homogeneity in all money 
variables held by the individual demand and supply functions. The property states 
that in a perfectly competitive world with full information and no friction, i.e., in a 
Walrasian world, if aU money variables vary by the same proportion, ô , an 
optimising, agent will not amend h is/her quantity decisions. Demand and supply (in 
real terms) remain therefore unchanged. Hence the dictum that monetary 
magnitudes are immaterial for rational agents' real decisions. FormaHy^^, such 
property reads
(1) x{ (^p, ôw) = (p, w),
where subscript /  refers to the individual price-taking consumer (producer); 
denotes the demand of i  for the final good (factor) j, p the vector of prices in the final 
good (input) market, and w the monetary income of i  (the scalar price of output
output delivered by that activity». The main implication of Say's law is that savings always equal 
investment See Beriassi e t al. (1994), p. 6.
28 For details see Stevenson e t al. (1988), pp. 28-44.
29 See Romer (1993), p. 7.
20 See Varian (1992), p. 31.
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produced by i). In passing, notice that 6  can be regarded as a change in the money 
stock. Let me remark that the zero-degree homogeneity of demand and supply 
functions is not assumed. Rather, it stems from the solution of utility and profit 
maximisation problems according to the traditional (i.e., neoclassical) microeconomic 
framework of individual choices.
As (1) describes the behaviour of a rational economic agent in a Walrasian world, 
some departures from this "perfect" world are needed for its breakdown and, 
consequently, for failure of the classical dichotomy^^. These departures are often 
called nominal imperfections. The use of the adjective nominal serves to remark that 
such imperfections cause nominal movements to have real effects. It is important not 
to confuse nominal with real imperfections. Both identify departures from the 
Walrasian world. Nonetheless, only the former generate money non-neutrahty^.
In the literature nominal imperfections usually take the form either of (i) money 
misperception or of (ii) rigid nominal wages and /o r prices. Models with money 
misperception belong to equilibrium macroeconomics. Models with nominal 
rigidities belong to non-market clearing macroeconomics. As for the sources of these 
two types of nominal imperfections, since the early 1970s different suggestions have 
been put forward. In Sections 5 and 6 I shall deal with money misperception due to 
imperfect information and nominal (wage) rigidity due to long-term wage contracts, 
respectively. While the next Chapter will be focused on nominal (price) rigidity due 
to costly price adjustments. First, however, it is worthwhile considering the so-called 
"monetary illusion" assumption on which models of money non-neutrality were 
more ore less explicitly based before the early 1970s^.
4. The monetary illusion assumption
21 Failure of the zero-degree homogeneiiy property is a necessary condition for money to have real 
effects at the microeconomic level. Nonetiieless, it may not be siÆcient at the macroeconomic level. 
Consider the following analogy. Zero (i.e., money neutrality) is the result of the sum not only of zeros 
(i.e., firm-specific nominal price flexibility), but also of non-zero numbers (i.e., firm-specific nominal 
price rigidity). It means that the aggregation across individual price behaviours is far from 
straightforward. I shall return to this issue in the next Chapter, where an account of Caplin and 
Spulber (1987) will be given.
22 See Romer (1993), p. 7.
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According to the monetary illusion assumption, individuals attach special 
significance to nominal magnitudes. Notably, workers hardly accept cuts in their 
money wages. Thus, in case of a downwards monetary contraction nominal wage 
adjustments turn out to be sluggish, unlike nominal price adjustments, which instead 
are (supposed to be) full and prompt. As a result, the real wage, W /P {W and P 
denote the nominal average wage and the general price level, respectively) goes up 
and, consequently, output and employment decrease^^.
Models based on the monetary illusion assumption, if capable of generating the non­
neutrality of money, nonetheless did not make clear why optimising economic 
agents, who in the absence of nominal imperfections should care only about real 
magnitudes, can be victims of monetary illusion. Over the 1960s the issue did not 
appear at the front of the MBC theorists' research agenda^. In retrospect, it can be 
said, as suggested by Blanchard (1990)^ ,^ that the existence of a «reliable empirical 
relation» between nominal and real variables (i.e., the Phillips curve-type trade-off 
between output and inflation) probably made appear less urgent the need for a 
rigorous justification of the real effects of money.
Only at the beginning of the 1970s, when economic events strongly contradicted the 
prediction based on the «unadorned Phillips c u r v e » 2 7  and a long period of high 
inflation and high unemployment (i.e., stagflation) occurred, it was no longer 
possible to ignore «the chasm between [traditional] microeconomic principles and 
macroeconomic practice»^. The time was ripe for trying to develop macroeconomic 
models of money non-neutrality grounded on firm microeconomic foundations^^.
5. Imperfect information and money misperception
23 See Blanchard (1990), p. 783
24 The monetary illusion assumption points towards countercyclical real wages, i.e., output and real 
wages would move in opposite directions over the cycle. Yet empirical studies suggest that real wage 
movements are acyclical or, at meet procyclical, see Mankiw (1990), p. 1656-7.
25 See Blanchard (1990), p. 784 and Mankiw (1990), p. 1647-48.
26 See Blanchard (1990), p. 784.
27 It is the first version of the Phillips curve-type relation, where expectations are ignored. The later 
version is the Rationale-Expectation-Augmented Phillips curve, see Mankiw (1990), p. 1647.
28 See Mankiw (1990), pp. 1647.
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The first attempt to explain money non-neutrality in terms of individual rational 
choices was made by R. Lucas^°, the leading figure of the New Classical 
macroeconomists of the first generations^. In Lucas (1972), the classical dichotomy 
breaks down because of monetary misperception due to a lack of information 
regarding the aggregate price level. The key ingredients of the model are (i) 
imperfect information and (ii) rational expectations. The former introduces 
uncertainty in an otherwise Walrasian framework. The Rational Expectation 
Hypothesis (REH) ensures that individuals form their expectations about the future 
using efficiently all the available information at the time of expectation formation. 
The REH, to be sure, does not rule out expectational errors. As rational agents cannot
predict the unpredictable, expectations may turn out to be wrong. Nonetheless, if this
\happens, it will be because of completely unforeseeable (i.e., non-systematic) events, 
occurred after expectations have been formed.
The intuition behind Lucas (1972) is the f o l l o w i n g ® ^ .  Consider an economy where 
individuals live in different islands between which information flows are costly^. 
Each producer can observe only price movements in his/her own price and in the 
prices of h is/her co-islanders. Whereas movements in other islands' prices and in the 
general price level become known only after some time lags. Consequently, a price- 
taking producer cannot distinguish whether unanticipated changes in his/her own 
good's price reflects movements in relative prices, which would justify quantity 
adjustments, or movements in the aggregate price level, which should be irrelevant 
for rational agents. The producer, in other words, becomes promptly aware of the 
occurrence of a shock. But he/she cannot immediately establish its nature. Now, if 
both real and nominal disturbances are random walk, the producer's optimal 
response to the observed change in h is/her price wiH be to attribute such change 
partly to unexpected movements in the aggregate price level (i.e., to a nominal shock)
29 The need for building macroeconomic theory based on solid microeconomic foundations was urged 
by E. Phelps and M. Friedman at the end of 1960s.
30 See McCaUum (1988), p. 463.
31 For an overview of New Classical macroeconomics see, among others, van Zijp (1993), Part n.
32 For details see Lucas (1977), Gordon (1981) pp. 506-9, Blanchard (1990), pp. 795-6, and Romer (1996), 
pp. 243-50.
33 The "island parable" was first used by E. Phelps; see Phelps (1970), p. 6.
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and partly to unexpected movements in relative prices (i.e., to a real shock). As a 
result, he/she will always revise his/her quantity decisions, even when changes in 
individual prices mimic movements in the aggregate price level. Hence the failure of 
the classical dichotomy.
Under the REH, only completely unpredictable events surprise rational agents. As 
systematic nominal movements in no way can be misperceived, they turn out to be 
neutral. This result was taken by New classical macroeconomists as a strong clue 
against Keynesians' recommendations for systematic stabilisation policy. It was 
argued that any attempt to stimulate the economy through countercyclical monetary 
measures that are applied in a uniform and consistent fashion ends up with a 
proportional expected  increase in the level of inflation, leaving the real side of the 
economy unchanged. Thus, the REH alone appeared to be able «to undo many of the 
central results of traditional Keynesian theory, most notably the stabilizing powers of 
aggregate demand policy»^. As it will be shown in the next Section, however, the 
introduction of nominal rigidities is enough to invalidate the New classical policy 
ineffectiveness proposition.
Despite its widespread popularity over the 1970s^^ the money misperception 
argument was later dismissed even by many adherents to the New classical 
macroeconomics^. The main reason for its repudiation was the implausibEity of its 
crucial assumption, namely that individual are unable to observe current nominal 
magnitudes. As pointed out among others by McCallum (1988), at least in modem 
economies, «information regarding aggregate nominal magnitudes -  money supply 
and price index figures -  is available to the public both promptly and cheaply»^L 
Thus, it is hard to believe that rational individuals can significantly misperceive 
movements in the aggregate price level. Unless they are «equipped with a pair of 
blinders that arbitrarily cuts [them] off from information printed in the daily
34 See Romer (1996), p. 256.
35 See Mankiw (19%), p. 165Z
36 See McCallum (1988), p. 464; Blanchard (1990), p 801; Mankiw (1990), p. 1653. As mentioned, many 
members of the New classical macroeconomics turn their attention to real shocks.
37 See McCallum (1988), p464.
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newspaper on aggregate variables like interest rates, price indexes and the money 
supply»^®.
6, Long-term contracts and nominal (wage) rigidity
Long-term nominal contract models, based on Fischer 1977 and Taylor 1980 works^^, 
represent the non-market-clearing reply to the theoretical attack made by New 
classical macroeconomists. The objective was to prove that systematic monetary 
policy can effectively stabilise the economy even under the REH.
Unlike Lucas (1972), where the Walrasian auctioneer makes sure that prices are 
flexible in all markets, long-term contract models are characterised by (i) price-setting 
agents in the labour market and (ü) nominal wage rigidity due to long-term 
contracts. Specifically, wage-setters (are supposed to) set nominal wages in contracts 
that are revised only at fixed intervals of time^. hi line with the REH, when nominal 
wages are set and /or revised economic agents take into account any future 
systematic monetary movements, such as expected inflation. Despite that, monetary 
policies can effectively stabilise the economy because wage adjustments to monetary 
shocks occur discretely rather than continuously^^.
A simple way to grasp the intuition behind this result is the following^. Let r  denote 
any fixed interval of time wage contracts remain in effect. The optimal level of 
aggregate output over r , y^, can be defined by
rO(2) p  .
where, q is the (average) nominal wage optimally set at the beginning of -r and 
is the aggregate price level over r .  Expression (2) implies a negative relation 
between the level of output and the (average) real wage, W^ q/P^ .
38 See Gordon (1981), p. 494.
39 For details see Blanchard (1990), pp. 803-6, and Romer (1996), 256-73.
40 It is also assumed that wage revisions are staggered across the economy. Staggering assumption is 
important in terms of persistency in the real effects of money. But it is not necessary for money non- 
neutrality to occur, nor for stabilisation policy to be effective. That is why I shall ignore it here.
41 Wage adjustments take place only when contracts are revised.
42 For details see, among others, Blanchard (1990), pp. 803-6, and Romer (1996), pp. 262-265.
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Goods markets are (supposed to be) perfectly competitive. So, is fully flexible and 
can be regarded as an indicator of the money stock.
In tO wage-setters determine their nominal wages according to the following rule:
(3) =
where expectations, £[-], are formed rationally.
The dynamics of the aggregate price level over t  is
(4)
where w is a predictable nominal component under the control of policy-makers, 
and Wy represents a stochastic (i.e., non-systematic) non-policy nominal disturbance. 
As expectations are formed rationally, if = 0, then = Consequently, tiie
aggregate level of output remain fixed at its optimal level, given in (2). But, if ?£ 0,
i.e., if there is a nominal shock, true and expected values of the aggregate price level 
wiU differ and the pre-set nominal wage, will be no longer optimal. That means
that the aggregate level of output deviates from its optimal level.
According to (2), the equilibrium output can be restored (ie., the nominal shock can 
be neutralised) either by varying the numerator, or by varying the denominator,
P^ . Since wage-setters can adjust their pre-set nominal wages only at the end of r , 
the former option is not promptly available. It is the aggregate price level that must 
take up the task. According to (4),; this implies an active role of monetary policy. 
Specifically, policy-makers can intervene to vary m as to offset the change in P^  due
to the unexpected monetary shock.
It is worthwhile noting that the idea behind the policy ineffectiveness proposition, 
namely that any systematic monetary measure does not surprise rational agents, still 
holds. Yet, as nominal wages are not revised continuously, monetary policy can 
effectively be used, if necessary, to stabilise the economy in the interval of time 
between two subsequent wage revisions.
6.1 Nominal rigidity: a missing link
u
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Long-term contract models succeeded in proving that non-passive systematic 
stabilisation policies are compatible with the REH. To the extent that nominal wages 
(or prices) do not adjust promptly in response to unexpected monetary shocks, there 
is always room for policy-makers' intervention in the Keynesian spirit, regardless of 
whether economic agents form their expectations efficiently or n o t Nonetheless, 
these models neglected to justify the existence of long-term contracts in terms of 
individual rational choices.
Allowed that long-term nominal contracts are the source of nominal rigidity and, 
consequently, of the highly undesirable volatility of output and employment, why 
should rational firms and workers agree to sign such "bad" contracts? Why not to 
choose different types of contracts as to neutralise (nominally-driven) economic 
fluctuations? Just Hke in the models based on the monetary illusion assumption, also 
in the long-term contract models nominal (wage) rigidity and the related real effects 
of money appeared to be the result of non-optimising behaviour. As if economic 
agents were willing to "leave $500 bills on the sidewalk"^.
At the beginning of the 1980s, the microeconomic foundations of nominal rigidity 
were still a missing Hnk in the non-market clearing theoretical system.
43 It paraphrases a famous quip by R Lucas against models with nominal rigidities, see Ball and 
Mankiw (1994), p. 137.
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FIGURE 1
1
Figure 1: neoclassical macromodel and money neutrality 
P  : aggregate price level;
y* : fuH-employment equilibrium level of aggregate output; 
AM : change in the money stock.
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Nominal rigidity and New Keynesian microfoimdations
This chapter deals with the New Keynesian microeconomic foundations of 
nominal rigidity. Specifically, it will be shown how nominal price inertia can be 
derived from individual optimising behaviour. Section 1 briefly introduces the key 
elements of New Keynesian microfoundations, namely (i) imperfectly competitive 
goods markets, (ii) small nominal friction, and (iii) some type of real rigidities. In 
Section 2, the seminal 1985 paper by Mankiw is examined in some detail. It will be 
shown that small menu costs, in principle, can cause "monetary" business cycles to 
have large welfare effects. The role of real rigidities in explaining nominal price 
stickiness is addressed in Section 3, where a short account of Ball and Romer (1989, 
1990) will be given. Because of real rigidity, multiple symmetric equilibria in nominal 
price adjustments can also arise. In Section 4 ,1 shall briefly consider the issue of price 
indexation. The remaining part of the chapter focuses on dynamic models of menu 
costs. In Section 5, the main features of time-dependent and state-dependent pricing 
rules are surveyed. Section 6 outlines the Caplin and Spulber 1987 model and its 
main implications.
1. Introduction
At the beginning of the 1980s, Keynesian economics still lacked satisfactory 
microeconomic foundations^. The missing link was some justification that could 
reconcile the postulate of individual optimising behaviour, which is central in the 
«orthodox» economic theory, with nominal rigidities, which are crucial in the (new) 
Keynesian theory of economic fluctuations^.
Over the 1980s, the "frustration" arising from the shortcomings of the "Old 
Keynesian"^ attempts to solve the puzzle led some economists to shift attention to
iSeeBanefa/.(1988),p. 1.
2 As mentioned in the previous Chapter, there is not a general consensus on this point among 
Keynesian economists.
3 See Mankiw (1987), p.105.
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imperfections in the goods rather than in the labour market^. It was the first step 
towards the creation of a theoretical apparatus later labelled as New Keynesian 
economics®. Among the many contributions aimed at providing New Keynesian 
microfoundations, the papers by Mankiw (1985) and Ball and Romer (1989,1990) are 
worthy of particular attention^. The former shows that small nominal frictions at the 
level of individual rational jBrms can in  principle bring about price rigidity at the 
aggregate leveF, which, in turn, cause money to have large, socially undesirable real 
effects. The latter prove that real rigidities, along with small menu costs, make 
Mankiw's conclusions much more plausible. Thus, the missing link seems to have 
been found in the combination of three key factors: (i) imperfectly competitive goods 
markets, (ü) small barriers in nominal adjustments at the microeconomic level 
(mainly in the form of costly price adjustments) and (iii) real rigidities.
2. Menu cost, nominal rigidity, and social welfare losses
It took some time to settle the controversy surrounding the microeconomics of 
nominal rigidity^. The merit of Mankiw (1985) was precisely to make breakthroughs 
in an area that at the time seemed to be highly controversial^. The central postulate of 
the model is that price adjustments are costly: price-setters can change their quoted
 ^«There are at least three major, well-known problems with the view that nominal wage inflexibility is 
crucial to understanding economic fluctuations. The first is that if nominal wage contracts are 
responsible for large and inefficient fluctuations in employment^ then rational workers should not 
agree to them. [...]. The second problem [...] is that it is not obvious that observed nominal wages 
directly affect employment decisions. [,..]. The final, and perhaps most serious, problem [...] is that 
real wages do not move over the business cycle as the theory predicts. According to this view, firms 
lay off workers in recession because labor costs are too high; prices have fallen but wages have not. In 
practice, however, real wages do not seem higher in récrions. To the extent that real wages appear 
cyclical at all, they seem procyclical». See Mankiw (1987), p.105-6.
5 For an overview of New Keynesian economics see Rotemberg (1987). See also Mankiw and Romer 
(1991), Mankiw (1992), Benassi e t aL (1994). A critical evaluation of New Keynesian economics is in 
Gordon (1990).
6 Further theoretical contributions are those of Akerlof and Yellen (1985), Parkin (1986), and 
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). A detailed bibliography can be found m Mankiw and Romer (1991).
7 The difficulties arising from aggregating across price-setters are dealt with in a later section of the 
present Chapter.
3 The criticism of lack in microeconomic fotmdations of Keynesian economics dates back to the early 
1970s.
9 An equally important paper is Akerlof and Yellen (1985), which appeared at the same time and in the 
same journal as Mankiw's. There, nominal frictions take the form of "near-rational" behaviour (i.e., a
19
Chapter 2: Nominal rigidity and New Keynesian microfoundations
nominal prices only by incurring a small fixed cost, the so-called menu cost^°. Under 
this assumption, Mankiw shows that a profit-maximising monopoly firm can be 
better off by keeping its nominal price fixed rather than by amending it in response 
to a change in the prevailing state of the market due to a monetary shock. This 
behaviour, though optimal from a private viewpoint, can be socially inefficient and 
cause large welfare losses. Such findings, according to Mankiw, call for an active 
monetary policy, in the Keynesian spirit It is worth examining Mankiw's model in 
some detail.
2.1. Assumptions in Mankiw (1985)
i) Profit-maximising monopolist producing a non-storable good. The 
assumption of non-storable goods allows to leave out problems concerning 
consumers' speculation on the timing of price movements^^. As for the goods market 
imperfection, in Mankiw (1985) it takes the form of monopoly. In Chapter four, I 
shall set up a model where strategically interactive price-setters instead of a 
monopolist are considered^^.
ii) Economy with nominal price contracts. Specifically, goods are supplied at 
monetary prices that are set in advance of trade (i.e., pre-set) by contracts^®.
iii) Nominal price contracts are not contingent to any nominal index. Nominal 
price indexation is therefore ruled out. Notice that this is a key assumption. If 
nominal prices were contingent to some nominal index, aggregate price level would 
be fully flexible and money neutral. Some potential justifications for the lack of 
indexation in the economy are presented in Section 4 of this Chapter.
smaU departure from full optimisation) instead of costly price adjustments. The findings are however 
similar to those in Mankiw (1985).
10 In the literature menu cc»ts are referred to as fixed  costs of changing nominal prices. Here menu 
costs are given a broader interpretation. They are taken to mean costly price adjustments. So, menu 
costs identify both lump-sum as well as variable costs of changing nominal prices.
11 Costly price adjustments with a storable good is examined in Benabou (1989).
12 My model generates Mankiw (1985)'s results as a special case.
13 Cf. Blinder and Mankiw (1984), type 3 economy.
20
Chapter 2: Nominal rigidity and New Keynesian microfoundations
iv) Changes in nominal prices are costly. Price-setters who amend their quoted 
nominal price incur a cost whose amount is fixed and does not depend on the size of 
price adjustmenti^.
v) Input markets are perfectly competitive. Since the Walrasian auctioneer 
regulates these markets, nominal input prices are fully flexible^®. As a result, they 
promptly and fully respond to nominal shocks^^.
vi) Quantity adjustments are costless^^. Firms supply whatever quantity 
consumers demand when trade takes place. This implies that goods market clears at 
any time. Neither rationing nor overproduction occur. The burden of market clearing 
is taken by quantity rather than price adjustments.
vii) Changes in the state of nature are due only to nominal disturbances, 
notably to a one-off nominal shock. This assumption is in line with the (new) 
Keynesian belief that economic fluctuations are primary and mainly driven by 
exogenous demand shocks (e.g., changes in velocity of money). Real magnitudes, 
notably real prices, are therefore time-invariant^^. Or rather, if movements in real 
variables occur, they will be due to money non-neutrality.
viü) The model adopts a static approach. Thus, the economy is initially in 
equilibrium.
The case of variable costs of changing prices (ie., the amount of menu costs increases with the size 
of price adjustment) is examined in Rotemberg (1982) and Konieczny (1993). Notice, however, that 
from a theoretical point of view lump-sum menu ccsts seem to be much more plausible. I shall revert 
to this point in the next chapter.
15 Cf. Blinder and Mankiw (1984). See also Andersen (1994), p. 71.
This assumption testifies the breakdown between "Old" and New Keynesians. The former focus on 
labour market imperfection and nominal wage rigidity, whereas the latter on goods market 
imperfection and nominal price rigidity. Thus, the hypothesis of fully flexible nominal input prices 
aims to prove that nominal rigidities m labour market are not necessary for explaining business cycles.
16 The case of rigid nominal prices in the input market as well as in the final goods market is examined 
both in Benassy (1987) and in Lucke (1995). In the latter, where a monopoly firm is considered, the 
findings do not confirm those of Mankiw (1985). In particular, no social ©cternality arises.
17 Were quantity adjustments costly, then the opportunity cost of keeping nominal prices fixed, i.e., of 
adjusting the quantity, would be affected also by the size of quantity adjustment costs. Costly 
quantity adjustments along with menu costs are examined in Andersen (1994) and (1995), and Lucke 
(1995). Quantity adjustment costs alone (instead of menu costs) are considered in Ginsbur^ e t al. 
(1991). Not surprisingly, the results are far from being consistent with each other.
18 By time-invariant real magnitudes I mean that real shocks, such as changes in technology or in 
consumers' tastes, are absent.
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2.2 The profit-maximisiiig price in real and nominal terms 
The demand function faced by the monopolist is:
(V d = / ( % U / ( p )  ^ < 0 ,
where:
d is the demand for the non-storable final good;
P is the nominal price (henceforth capital letters will denote nominal magnitudes);
JV is a nominal scale variable and denotes the (exogenous) level of aggregate 
demand. It may be any nominal indicator, such as the money stock or the level of 
GNP;
s  p  is the (underlying) real price.
The inverse market demand function is
(2) ^  = M i)  => F  = h{d)K r
where h s  f ~^ .
The real cost function reads
(3) c^g {q )  ^ ^ 0 /  
where:
c denotes the real total costs of production; 
q is the level of output.
Multiplying both sides of (3) by N  yields the production costs in nominal terms^^ 
i.e.,
(4) c -N  = g{qyN => C == g{q)'N ,
In case of constant average and marginal production costs^, the cost function can be 
defined as follows
c = kq <=> C -  kqN
where k is the constant marginal cost.
It holds because of assumption (v).
20 A more general cost function does not alter the results. See Mankiw (1985).
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From (2) and (4), it is clear that both nominal prices, P , and nominal costs, C , move 
proportionally to iV. In the absence of some nominal friction, the classical dichotomy 
holds and changes in N  are fully reflected in changes in nominal magnitudes.
As the goods market is assumed to clear, output always equals demand. Thus, 
d ^ q .
The nominal profit function is given by
(5) n { p ) ^ n { N ,p ) = q - i p - k ) - N .
The corresponding real profit function reads
f  p \(6) J = Tcip) ^ q - ( p - k ) .
Under standard microeconomic assumptions, the profit function is strictly concave in 
p . So, there is only a single value of the real price for which the profit maximisation 
conditions are m et Letting = argmax 7c(p)f the corresponding optimal price in 
nominal terms reads Pj^  = Npj^^. According to the inverse elasticity rule
(7)
P m ax  ^  R P m x  ^
where s  is the demand elasticity with respect to price. '
From (7), the nominal profit maximising price yields i
f  iV^ !(8) Pm x^RPm x-=^R^\^  • IV \
Equation (8) allows to see that the optimal nominal price is homogeneous of degree j
P /  • ^one in A/! In other words, the ratio is constant. This confirms that rational |
{economic agents are concerned only with real variables. What really matters is the 1i
(underlying) real profit maximising price, which is independent from A/and I
time-invariant, as there are no real disturbances (assumption (vii)). î
Although economic agents are concerned with real magnitudes, prices are commonly |
set in monetary terms. Besides, the monopolist is assumed to quote his/her nominal j
profit-maximising price in advance of the trade. Thus, at the moment of price '
quotation (time 0), he/she must consider future realisations of N, namely the value |
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taken by N  when trade takes place (time 1). The nominal price quoted by the 
monopolist can be written as
(^) — PmAxR  f
where:
0 2max ^  ex-ante optimal nominal price;
denotes monopolist's expectations concerning future realisation of N.
If the firm's expectations prove to be correct so that =N^ {N^ denotes the nominal 
scale variable's realisation at the moment of trade), then o^W  be also the ex- 
posf nominal profit maximising price. In fact,
(10)
Otherwise, if (i.e., a nominal shock has occurred), turns out to be no
longer optimal, as the underlying real price, Pi s  qPj^  I , differs from p^ucr
(11)
According to the nominal scale variable's realisation, the sub-optimal real price, pj, 
may be larger or smaller than the optimal real price, pj^ . Specifically,
for > iVj (i.e., in case of negative nominal shocks), then p^  > Pmax',
for (i.e., in case of positive nominal shocks), then pj < p^ .
2.3 The decision problem and the private mcentive for rigidity
If a monetary shock has occurred (i.e., ^  iVJ, the price-setter will have to decide
as whether to adjust or not h is/her quoted nominal price in response to the shock. By 
choosing to adjust the price-setter incurs a fixed menu cost, Zr and sets the
nominal price in such a way th a t
where is the new nominal price.
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Moreover, as {t) is chosen as to maximise profit, also the optimal real price at time 
4 p* (/), is related to M{t) -  P{l) .
It is important now to find a way to show the hnk between the optimal real price and 
aggregate output. For our purpose, it is enough to notice that
(20) >(0=[m ( 0 - p ( 4
where y(7) refers to (the log of) total output.
Equation (20) is a simplified version of the aggregate demand equation®^. It implies 
an inverse relationship between the aggregate price level and total output, which is 
the essential feature of aggregate demand®®.
Given equation (20), it is straightforward to express firm /  s real pricing rule at time t 
as a function of aggregate output
(21) p’it)=p,\y({%
Let me stress that the approach I have adopted to get (21) is just a shortcut. A 
thorough derivation of the relation between p* (/) and aggregate output requires a 
fuU specification of the model. However, it is beyond the scope of this section® .^ 
Following Romer (1996)®®, I write firm /  s real pricing rule as
(22) p* ( 0 = A  [y(0]-  ^+ # 0   ^ P(/)],
where:
c is a positive constant, whose value depends upon the features of consumer 
demand for the commodity produced by firm i  (notably the elasticity of demand)®®,
^ is a parameter referring to the features of the technology function and its value is 
strictly positive®^.
81 See Caplin and Spulber (1987), p. 706.
82 It reproduces in its essence the Fisher equation (with the velocity of money circulation normalised to 
unity).
83 Sœ Romer (1996), p. 245.
84 What matters here it is to provide a formal proof of Caplin and Spulber (1987)'s result For rigorous 
derivation of (25) see Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), which is usually taken as a benchmark for 
modelling macroeconomic models with imperfectiy competitive markets. See also Caplin and Spulber 
(1987), and Romer (1996), pp 257-62.
85 See Romer (1996), p. 260.
88 Letting Tj be the elasticity of demand, then c = Inj;// (77 — l)].
87 See Romer (1996), p. 261-2.
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It may be worthwhile remarking that expression (22) is nothing else bu t the inverse 
elasticity rule, which states that «a producer with market power sets price as a 
markup over marginal cost, with the size of the markup determined by the elasticity 
of demand».
For simplicity, c is normalised to zero.
Rearranging equation (22) according to the definition of real price provided earlier, it 
yields
(22a) p;(0-p(0=<^ Mf)--p(f)]«>■p<*(0=#f(0+(i-((>M0/
where P*(t) is the optimal nominal price that firm i  will quote at time t, if there are 
no menu costs.
Since Af(/) increases continuously over time, the pricing rtde in (22a) implies 
continuous nominal price adjustments. Consequently, rational price-setters pursue it 
only in the absence of menu costs. Otherwise, if a fixed cost is incurred at each price 
change, they will prefer to amend their nominal prices only occasionally and with 
discrete jumps®®.
In Caplin and Spulber (1987), firms are supposed to pursue an (S^s) pricing policy, as 
introduced by Sheshinski and Weiss® .^ Specifically, whenever the nominal price is 
adjusted, it is set so that the underlying real price equals some target upper level, 5  
(henceforth, .s'f;)’^ . This quoted nominal price is then kept fixed until the underlying 
real price has been eroded by money growth down to some trigger lower bound, s  
(henceforth j^). At this point, nominal price is re-adjusted upwards; the real price 
returns to the upper limit; and the process begins anew. Notice that the size of 
nominal price adjustments is equal to - s ^ )  and is constant over time. Moreover,
nominal adjustments are always upwards (i.e., a one-sided pricing policy), as there is 
no deflation.
Now, consider a monetary expansion AM <(sxj - S i )  over some period of time, r . 
We are interested in deterrnining the resulting changes in the aggregate price level
88 This issue will be addressed in Chapter three.
89 The Sheshinski and Weiss 1977 paper will be outlined in Chapter three.
70 In my notation capital letters refer to nominal magnitudes. Thus, to avoid confusion, replaces 5.
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and output, AP and Ay. As for the change in the aggregate price level, we need to 
find the fraction of price-setters who respond to the monetary expansion by adjusting 
their nominal prices. According to the pricing policy described above, a firm (say, i) 
changes its nominal price at time f if (?) = , which is equivalent to
(23) P ,-p ;(f)  = ^ i CS. P , - p ; ( f - r )  = 5i
where is firm /  s (rigid) nominal price, currently in effect, and
p/(r) = p*{t -  r)+  àP* is the optimal price firm /  would quote at time fin  case of zero 
menu costs.
Condition (23) implies that nominal prices are changed by those firms with initial 
(i.e., at time r - r )  values of P, - P / ( f - t) that are equal to +AP/. Since the initial 
values of P^  are supposed to be uniformly distributed over (5^,%], the
AP*fraction of price-setters to whom condition (23) applies i s   — . From (26b), AP*
can be expressed as ifiAM -  (l -  (f)AP.
Bearing in mind that the size of each nominal price adjustment is it is easy
to determine the change in the aggregate price index, which is given by 
AP*(24) AP = - =i i — +% ~^L
Equation (24) implies that AM = AP and, taking into account (20), that Ay = 0. As a 
result, although firm-specific nominal prices adjust discretely to monetary 
expansions, the aggregate price level is fully flexible and money turns out to be 
neutral.
The intuition behind the result formalised in equation (24) is that firm-specific 
nominal price changes can have large impacts on the aggregate price level. Notably, 
the adjustment of those firms whose real prices have hit the trigger value Sj^ , fully 
compensates the rigidity arising from the behaviour of the non-adjusting firms. 
Before concluding, it is worth pointing out that the neutrality of money in Caplin and 
Spulber (1987) cannot be taken as a general and robust result. As the themselves
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authors recognise^, it strongly depends upon specific assumptions. In particular, the 
uniformity distribution of initial prices and, more importantly, the absence of 
deflation. If inflation is positive as well as negative, so that nominal adjustments are 
both upwards and downwards (i.e,, two-sided pricing policy), then firm-specific 
nominal rigidity wifi generally lead to aggregate price inertia and money non- 
neutrality^. Thus, their model is an important contribution not so much for its 
(rather specific) results, but because it draws attention to the fact that it may be 
misleading to infer the features of the aggregate price level simply from firm-specific 
price decisions^. The issue of aggregation calls for specific and careful analyses.
71 See Caplin and Spulber (1987), pp. 719-21.72 In Caplin and Leahy (1991) firms pursue a two-sided {Sy.s) price adjustment policy and money turns 
out to affect output
73 See Romer (1996), p. 276.
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FIGURE 1 7C
M l
P m ax
Figure 1: the role of the profit function's curvature 
ùsN denotes the size of the (positive) nominal shock;
P m a x  is the real profit maximising price;
is the sub-optimal real price in case of nominal rigidity; 
ah is the ccst of rigidity in case of a relatively flat profit function; 
ac is the cost of rigidity when the profit function is more sensitive 
to departure from the optimal price.
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FIGURE2
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ADJP m ax
 1 1 >9
Figure 2: firm-specific nominal price rigidity and social welfare
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FIGURES
-5 *  < S < + S "
M ultiple Multiple
Equilibria Equilibria
— — — — — — — — ^  — 5 < 6 < ô - X ------------------ >
Figure 3: multiple equilibria in nominal price adjustment
-<----- >  denotes the range of nominal shocks for which non-adjustment is
an equiHbrium choice for a single firm.
^  y  denotes the range of nominal shocks for which adjustment is an
equilibrium choice for a single firm.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
1. Derivation of (15a)
In order to derive the optimal nominal pricing rtde in (15a) both the market demand 
and the cost function faced by firm i  must be specified^^ The market demand is 
defined by
(lAp) rf,
\PiJ J
where:
Pf is the nominal price quoted by firm f,
P  is the aggregate price level;
N  is the nominal scale variable.
Assuming that labour, /, is the only input, firm / s production function is given by 
y,. - Y>\,
where y, is firm I s  level of output.
Letting W be the nominal wage cost, firm / s cost function reads 
(2Ap) C = W -(y ,J .
Under the assumption of fully flexible input nominal prices, W ^  N .
Firm / s objective is to quote as to maximise its profit, i.e.,
(3Ap) maxn, =P,-di -C , = _p-w>
Solving the profit maximisation problem in (3Ap) yields:
Consequently,
(4Ap)
where:
More details are in Andersen (1994), p. 41-3.
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aQ -1
6==l+ao(y-l); 
a = {aQ - a iX r - i ) ;  
c = l + a ^ ( / - i ) .
Since cjb is equal to l - a j h ,  (4Ap) can be written as 
(5Ap) QED,
where alb  has been replaced by m and k  has been normalised to unity, for 
simplicity.
By expressing the price formula (5Ap) in log terms, it is straightforward to see that
dlnA '27 = ------- .ainP  j
That is why m can be regarded as a measure of the degree of strategic j
complementarity in price decisions. |
i2. Derivation of (16a) |
The second-order Taylor approximation of firm I s  profit function j
iaround the point  ^Pi^max reads: !
5ET f ^  IFor the first order condition of profit maximisation problem ■ ^  is equal to zero. j
I
Now, setting P i equal to o the second order Taylor approximation for the second j
I
term of (16) yields:
Substituting it into (16) yields (16a), QED. j
3. Derivation of (18)
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Consider the LHS expression in (17a). Substituting 1 and 1 + ^  for Pi and Ni, 
respectively, yields
Using the first-order Taylor approximation (l + x)"* = l + ?wx, the above expression 
becomes
QED.
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The microeconomics of menu costs
Theoretical studies on costly price adjustments date back to the early 1970s. 
Most of them focus either on monopoly or on monopolistic competition. Attempts to 
analyse menu costs within a strategically interactive setting are rare indeed and 
typically consider real rather than nominal shocks. The first part of the chapter 
surveys some of the relevant microeconomic studies on menu costs. Section 1 
outlines Barro (1972) and Sheshinski and Weiss (1977). It will be shown that the 
optimal pricing policy for a monopolist faced w ith costly price adjustments and a 
continuously increasing rate of inflation takes the form of an {S,é} rule. In Section (2), 
an overview of recent game-theoretic frameworks with menu costs is given. It will be 
argued that these models fail to capture the theoretical essence of menu costs. The 
last part of the chapter deals with the issue of the empirical relevance of costly price 
adjustments. What do menu costs look like? Are they simply administrative costs 
related to the technology used to quote monetary prices; or must they be given a 
broader interpretation?
1. Theoretical studies: the forerunners
Menu costs are often associated w ith New Keynesian economics. Nonetheless, 
theoretical studies on costly price adjustments can be traced back at least to the early 
1970s, when J.R. Barro issued his seminal notes on monopolistic price adjustment. 
The purpose of the paper was to cast light on price response to out-of-equilibrium 
situations in markets where sellers rather than the fictitious Walrasian auctioneer 
were expected to set prices. To this end, Barro considered a monopoly price-setter 
faced w ith a stochastic demand schedule and examined the price responsiveness to 
unexpected demand variations^. In so far as price adjustments are costless, it is 
optimal for the monopolist to make h is/her price vary promptly in such a way that 
the profit maximisation condition, i.e., marginal revenue equal to marginal cost, is
1 See Barro (1972). There is an earlier literature on price adjustment and, consequently, on the validiiy 
of the law of supply and demand across different market structures. But costs of changing prices were 
ignored. See, among others. Arrow (1959) and Gordon and Hynes (1970).
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always m e t The "Law of Supply and Demand" according to which price movements 
are inversely related to the excess of supply, therefore, holds continuously. So
-— = f { S - D )  with / ’<0 and / ( o ) = 0 ,  
where f denotes time and (S - D )  excess of supply.
But, as soon as price changes are associated w ith some (lump-sum) costs, then a 
trade-off arises between adjustment and non-adjustment Let z  and Atv denote, 
respectively, the cost of changing prices and the cost of keeping the price fixed at a 
suboptimal level (i.e., where marginal revenue differs from marginal cost). The 
individual price-setter wBl choose to adjust h is/her price only when A;r turns out to 
be larger than z. As a result, the monopolistic price adjustment rule comes to take a 
discrete rather than a continuous form. Price amendments do not occur at each out- 
of-equilibrium situation, but only occasionally. The "Law of Supply and Demand" 
still holds: prices do not go up when supply exceeds demand. Nonetheless, the above 
differential equation is no longer suitable for describing the optimal price adjustment 
rule arising when some sort of price adjustment cost exists^.
1.2 Menu costs and the effects of inflation
Barro's (1972) theoretical study paved the way for subsequent and more particular 
analyses. Specifically, E. Sheshinski and Y. Weiss, starting from the consideration
that price variations may be called for by either nominal or real changes in the state
of the nature^, focused their studies on how inflation, along with menu costs, can 
affect the monopolistic price adjustment policy. In their 1977 paper a constant and 
certain rate of inflation was considered; whereas in the 1983 article they extended the 
analysis to the case of stochastic inflation. In line w ith Barro's (1972) conclusions, 
Sheshinski and Weiss found that costly price adjustments can induce a monopoly 
firm to change its nominal price «occasionally rather than continuously». And this 
even when future inflation is fully anticipated.
2 The nature of the disturbances is left unspecified,
3 See Barro (1972), p. 24.
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Key features of the Sheshinsky and Weiss (1977) model are:
i) the state of nature continuously changes over time because of a constant rate of 
inflation;
ii) movements in the real side of the economy, if any, are nominally based. Thus, real 
variables are p erseiim e  invariant (unless money turns out to be non-neutral);
iii) the inflationary process is non-stochastic. The monopolistic price-setter predicts 
exactly the rate of inflation at any time and no uncertainty affects the economy;
iv) adjustments of nominal price are costly^. In particular, the cost of changing price 
is supposed to be lump-sum.
Within this dynamic model a profit maximising firm when choosing its optimal price 
policy must take into account that inflation continuously erodes the real price 
underlying its quoted nominal price, and that every nominal price adjustment 
implies a cost.
Some notation®:
Pf : nominal price charged by the monopoly firm at time t  
G, : rate of inflation at time t  
: real interest rate at time t  
z, : real lump-sum cost of adjusting price at time t
As the rate of inflation, the real interest rate, and the lump-sum menu cost are 
supposed to be constant over time, the f subscript is dropped out henceforth.
P, s  : aggregate price level at time 4 (f^ is normalised to 1).
P t-P f IP( : underlying real price at time t  
7r{pt): real profit^ at time t
Vq : present discounted value of real profits at time 0.
4 Nominal changes are commonly associated with variations in money stock, and real changes with 
technology improvements.
3 As in most menu cost macromodels, nominal input prices (especially nominal wages) are supposed 
to be fully flexible. So, real marginal costs are constant over time. Furthermore, output is implicitly 
assumed to be always equal to sales, whatever
6 Capital letters denote nominal magnitudes.
7 The profit function is supposed to be differentiable and strictly quasi-concave so as to ensure the 
existence of a unique maximum.
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Now, if is any interval over which the nominal price is left unchanged, the
flow of net real profit during this time period discounted to time 0 is given by:
(1 ) ■e-°‘ )-e '‘d t - z - e ' " ' »  ,
where;
denotes the fixed nominal price over the interval;
is the cost of adjusting price incurred at time discounted at time 0.
The present discounted value of real profits at time 0 is given by the sum of 
expressions like (1), each one referring to the interval between two immediately 
subsequent nominal price adjustments:
(2)= v „ = 2r=0
Notice that in (2) the summation operator indicates that the nominal price is changed 
discretely. Whereas the integral operator denotes that the underlying real price varies 
continuously over the interval so does the profit
The decision problem faced by the firm consists of deterrnining the optimal price 
policy, namely the sequences of nominal prices, {P^}, and of points in time,
T = 1,2,..., that maximise Vq .
Let us focus for a moment on the simple case of the finite time horizon: 0 ^  -r ^  2.
Vq reads
firms choice variables are and . The first order conditions for the maximisation 
of Vq yield:
(3a) ^  = 0=>[;t(p„ •e'® ')+2r - ;r (? , = 0 ,8ti
8 The initial nominal price, Pq / is assumed to be given. Moreover, Îq is set equal to 0. Vq is supposed 
to be such that an interior maximum does exist
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(3b) - ^  = 0 =>’f— =5P. JSP,
From (3a) and (3b) it is straightforward to derive the general first order conditions for 
the maximisation of (2). These are:
(4a) ^  = =0  r=l,2,..„dtf
SP, J ÔP,
The optimal nominal pricing policy for the firm is given by solving the above set of 
equations for and As the relevant real variables are time-independent, this 
policy turns out to be periodic^, i.e., the firm finds it optimal to adjust its nominal 
price at fixed intervals, fp+i - t ^ = s  {s positive constant), according to the rule
4.1 = 4  V r = l,2,....
Such policy implies that the underlying real price in each fixed-nominal-price period, 
s , is continuously eroded by the constant rate of inflation, G. More precisely, at the 
beginning of s , when the nominal adjustment takes place, the real price turns out to 
be equal to an upper bound value, jy s  . Over s  the real price continuously
slides towards a lower bound, Sj-^P^' z  which is reached at the end of
the period. At this point, a new price adjustment occurs and the real price bounces 
back to Sfj. The symbols (% , jr^) have been used instead of the more common (^ --s) to
avoid confusion^®.
Conditions (4a) and (4b) can be re-written as follows:
(5a)i  ^ ;r{s i)+zr~;r{su)-0 .
9 For the formal proof see Sheshmsld and Weiss (1977). For an mtuitive explanation see also Andersen 
(1994), p. 81.
10 X recall that in my description of Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) capital letters denote nominal 
variables. It may be interesting to note that the ^spiype xwlicy emerged originally from the 
investigation into the inventory holding jjroblem. For some references see both Barro (1972) and 
Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) and (1983).
11 This condition has been derived applying the transformation p, = to (4a).
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(5b) 7 — ='  3 SP
The former equation says that the optimal lower and upper bounds, 5^  and s^,
respectively, are chosen in such a way that the gain from postponing the adjustment,
i.e., the interest saved on the adjustment cost, zr , equals the gain from adjusting the 
nominal price, J^{su)-n:{sL)> In passing, the price policy is not symmetric around the
time-invariant optimal real price, p*, notably, ;r(%) is larger than see Figure
1, The latter equation says that s  is chosen so that the average of present value 
marginal profits over s  is equal to zero.
FIGURE 1 at the end of the chapter.
It is important to notice that marginal costs are not equal to marginal revenues at s^j. 
Which means that the optimal real price, p ., lies within the open interval 
Thus, «the firm operates initially with negative marginal profits and with positive 
marginal profits towards the end of each period»R This can be seen from (5b). If 
were equal to p*, then (5b) would never be m e t Specifically, the average present 
value marginal profits would be always positive. For (5b) to be met, some marginal 
profits over s  must be negative, which implies that Su must be strictly larger than
P*’
As mentioned, Sheshisnki and Weiss (1983) extended the analysis by allowing for 
stochastic inflation. Uncertainty was introduced into the model through the 
assumption that the economy swings randomly between two deterministic states of 
nature; one with zero inflation, the other with a positive and constant rate of 
inflation, G, just like in Sheshinski and Weiss (1977). Let the former state of nature be 
denoted by 0 and the latter by 1. Let also 7^(r) and 7 (^7) be the total time spent in
state 0 and 1, respectively, during the interval [o,r]. The aggregate price level, P ,,
12 See Sheshinski and Weiss (1977), p. 290.
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continuously increases only in state 1. In particular, over [0,f] it evolves according to 
the rule P, = being Pq == 1.
The key 1977 result was confirmed. The pricing rule still holds. The nominal
price adjustment takes place when the underlying real price has reached a bottom 
value, . And the nominal change is such that the underlying real price jumps back 
to an upper limit, 5y. But, as the inflationary process is now supposed to be 
stochastic, the fixed-nominal-price period, s  f comes to be random. In passing, Sy 
and do not change over time simply because the non-zero rate of inflation, G, is 
supposed to be constant. As soon as the assumption is relaxed, the values
turn out to vary over time^^.
Both in their (1977) and in the (1983) analysis Sheshinski and Weiss investigated also 
how the rate of inflation, G, and the size of menu costs, zr, can affect the difference 
between the upper and the lower bounds, (s^ -  j^), as well as the frequency of price
adjustments (i.e., the length of g). While the effects of changes in the rate of inflation 
appear to be dependent on the type of model (certainty or uncertainty)^^, no doubt 
that an increase in the size of menu costs leads to a less frequent price change and, 
accordingly, to larger price adjustments, when they take place.
2. Costly price adjustments and oligopoly
Dealing with costly price adjustments requires a departure from the perfect 
competition framework, in which price decisions are delegated to an impersonal 
auctioneer. Such departure can take on as many shapes as there are alternative iypes 
of imperfectly competitive markets. Nonetheless, the imperfection on which the 
prevailing menu cost macromodels^® are based has mainly the form either of 
monopoly or of monopolistic competition, where strategic interaction is absent. To 
the best of my knowledge, only J.J. Rotemberg and M. Woodford set up a (general
13 See Sheshinski and Weiss (1983), footnote 2.
14 See Sheshinski and Weiss (1983), p. 514.
15 For references on menu cost macromodels see, among others, Mankiw and Romer (1991) and 
Andersen (1994).
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equilibrium) macromodel w ith oligopolistic firms and costly price adjustments^^. 
Their analysis was empirically-oriented and little attention was devoted to 
theoretical implications. The authors^ purpose was, in fact, to compare the predictive 
power of their model w ith an analogous perfectly competitive framework. Hence, 
they computed the two models' forecasts of the economy's responses to exogenous 
aggregate demand shocks (in the form of changes in the U.S, Government military 
spending) and checked which of the two predicted series better matched the 
empirical responses derived from U.S. data. In passing, the findings were in favour 
of their oligopolistic model.
The search for oligopoly models w ith costly price adjustments will appear to be 
slightly more fruitful, if one turns the attention to the microeconomic literature. In 
particular, game-theoretic frameworks aimed to investigate into the implications of 
menu costs for strategically interactive price-setters are set up in Bemahrdt (1993), 
Slade (1996a) and Hansen et al. (1996)^ .^ Also Rotemberg and Saloner 1987 model, to 
be sure, considers oligopoly price-setters faced with menu costs. Nonetheless, the 
analysis is barely concerned to shed light on the strategic implications of costly price 
adjustments. The authors' intention is, indeed, to provide a theoretical justification 
for the well established observation^^ that «monopolists generally change their prices 
less frequently than oligopolists». To this end, Rotemberg and Saloner focus on menu 
costs as the reason why rational price-setters may opt for nominal sticky prices. 
Under the assumption of costly price adjustments they analytically derive «the 
relative incentives of monopolists and duopolists to adjust their prices when 
underlying cost and demand conditions change or when inflation erodes existing 
prices». A comparison of such incentives reveals that the cost of keeping prices fixed
45 See Rotemberg and Woodford (1992).
47 Notice that there are more game-theoretic models where prices are sticky. I refer, in particular, to 
Fershtman and Kamien (1987) and (1990), Tsutsui and Mino (1990). Yet, price rigidity is assumed 
rather than derived. In Fershtman and Kamien 1987 model, for example, (real) price rigidity arises 
because the current desirability for each duopoly fimYs homogeneous output is supposed to be «an 
exponentially weighted function of accumulated past consumption». It leads to rigidiiy in the current 
price. Notably, «the current price of the good does not decline by as much to accommodate any given 
level of current consumption as it would be if its desirability were a function solely of present 
consumption»; see Fershtman and Kamien (1987), p. 1151.
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is higher for each tight duopoly price-setter than it is for a monopolist, facing the 
same configuration of demand. Hence, the relative rigidity of monopoly pricing. In 
Rotemberg and Saloner's words, «circumstances that lead a monopolist to change its 
prices would always encourage duopolists to do so as well, while the reverse is not 
true»^^.
Reverting to the three models mentioned above, namely Bernhardt (1993), Slade 
(1996a) and Hansen e t al. (1996), they share a common feature: they neglect to 
distinguish between nominal and real magnitudes. Specifically, aU variables are 
expressed in real terms and no emphasis is placed on whether the source of the 
disturbances is nominal or real. In Bernhardt (1993) the economy is assumed to be 
affected by «a shock to production costs which is common to all firms». Letting Cq
denote the initial value of the real marginal cost of production, which is identical for 
all firms, the ex-postieal marginal cost is given by
Cj + +
where p  is a. predictable linear trend in marginal cost evolution over time, and 
represents the white noise shock to costs.
As for the source of Jj, according to Bernhardt, «[o]ne could interpret it as 
technology shock, or assume that it is nominally based» Notice, however, that in 
so far as the shock is assumed to be nominally based, it is necessary to specify the 
reasons of its nea/effects (i.e., the change in the real marginal cost). In particular, it is 
necessary to specify what prevents nominal magnitudes from promptly and fully 
adjusting in response to the nominal shock. In Bernhardt (1993), to be sure, these 
reasons can be neither the existence of menu costs, nor the price-setters' reaction to 
the presumed nominal shock. The real marginal cost's variation, in fact, occurs prior
48 Rotemberg and Saloner (1987), pp. 917-8, provides a list of empirical analyses, dating back to the 
Stigler's 1947 study, where the relative rigidity of monopoly and oligopoly pricœ is compared.
49 See Rotemberg and Saloner (1987), p. 925.20 See Bernhardt (1993), p. 529,
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to any price-setters' decisions^. It turns out that the source of the disturbance must 
be real22.
We shall come to the same conclusion, if we look at Hansen e t al. (1996). Here, the 
shock generates a shift in the demand function faced by each strategically interactive 
firm. Let producer / s demand function be 
q^=a-bpi  + cpj w ith / = 1,2^  j ,
where pi and p j  are the real prices of goods produced by firm 1 and j, respectively.
Following a «completely unanticipated shock», the demand's intercept, a, varies by 
àa. Just like in Bernhardt (1993), in Hansen e t al. (1996) as well the shock has real 
effects irrespective of how price-setters respond to i t  As a result, its source cannot be 
nominal.
Finally, Slade (1996a) considers a zero-inflation economy (monetary variables are 
time invariant) and no distinction between real and nominal prices is made^. Also in 
this case the source of the (generic) shock turns out to be real.
In the light of the foregoing, the allegation that neither Bernhardt (1993), nor Hansen 
at al, (1996), nor Slade (1996a) capture the essence of menu costs does not seem 
inappropriate. To make my point clear, recall that the costs of adjusting nominal 
prices are theoretically relevant because they allow of a reconciliation between 
rationality and nominal price rigidity. Small menu costs can induce profit- 
maximising price-setters not to adjust their monetary prices, despite the occurrence 
of a nom inal shock. The resulting nominal price rigidiiy^^ causes the classical 
dichotomy to break down. Thus, monetary disturbances have real effects only in case 
of (some degree of) nominal rigidities. A completely different story holds for real 
disturbances. They always have real effects. No matter whether nominal prices are 
rigid or not and, consequently, no matter whether nominal barriers (such as menu
24 Price-setters'' décision problem as to whether adjust or not their prices is indeed triggered by the 
unexpected change in the real marginal cost.22 The only way the cost shock in Bernhardt (19%) can be regarded as noininally based is to assume 
that there is some degree of nominal rigidity within other markets, different from the one under 
study.
23 It is a zero-inflation economy. See Slade (1996a), p. 3.
24 Monetary prices are said to be rigid if they do not promptly and fully adjust to monetary 
disturbances.
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costs) exist or not. It turns out that the existence of costly nominal price adjustments 
is far more crucial within a setting where monetary variables are clearly identified 
and where nominal rather than real disturbances are taken into account. I shall 
return to this point in the next chapter. Therein, the response of strategically 
interactive price-setters faced w ith menu costs to a shock, whose source is definitely 
nominal, wül be analysed.
3. Empirical studies
Since the macroeconomic debate on nominal rigidity has turned its attention to the 
goods market, there has been a revival of empirical investigations into price 
behaviour^. Over the last decade and more, surveys have been carried out in order 
to determine whether prices are sticky; and if so, what induces firms to keep prices 
unchanged. The results are twofold. On the one hand, they strongly support the idea 
of price rigidity. Prices of many different goods are found to remain unchanged for 
one year or even more^^. Some caveats must however be added. First of all, 
unchanged prices do not necessarily imply price rigidity. If economy is not affected 
by any disturbance, prices wiU be certainly fixed. Secondly, it is hard to detect 
whether recorded price movements are due to nominal or real shocks. So, the 
observed rigidity may refer to real as well as to nominal prices. Finally, the results 
depend upon the type of goods considered. For example, if the commodity can be 
easily differentiated, firms may react to changes in the state of nature by putting on 
the market along with the "old" product a "new" one, slightly different from the 
former^^. In doing so, firms can leave the price of the old product unchanged, 
whereas the price of the new commodity is set optimally^. Under these
25 Empirical analyses on price behaviour have a long history, dating back to the late 1920s. See Carlton 
(1989) for a short overview and references therein. See also Gordon (1990).
26 Among others see Rotemberg (1982b), Carlton (1986), Cecchetti (1986), Roberts (1992), Blinder 
(1994), Kashyap (1995), HaU eta l. (1996). See also Neumark and Sharpe (1992), where price rigidity is 
examined w itto  banking industry.
27 For instance, because of a new colour or a new packaging.
28 This strategy was suggested to me by some Italian businessmen in the textile industry.
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circumstances, a price investigation performed into the "old" commodity will 
suggest a higher degree of rigidity than it is in reality^^.
As regards the source of the rigidity, on the other hand, microeconomic evidence is 
still puzzling; in the sense that price behaviour emerging from the empirical 
investigations does not follow any simple pattern. Accordingly, the type and the 
concrete features of the barriers which lead to rigid prices are still shrouded in 
mystery. Are costly price adjustments a suitable type of nominal friction for fitting 
the facts? And if yes, what they look tike? The former question can be possibly better 
answered by those who set prices. This was Blinder's suggestion who carried out an 
interview study among a sample of American businessmen in order to test different 
theories of price rigidity^. Though not brilliantly, costly price adjustments passed the 
exam^^. They got an average score of 1,89 out of four®^ . But as for their features, 
namely whether they are constant or variable, consensus is far from being reached. 
Such lack of unaitirnity is mainly due to the fact that the empirical evidence of menu 
cosis is elicited indirectly^. Infrequent and relatively large price changes are taken as 
a clue of lump-sum menu costs. While the existence of variable menu costs is 
commonly inferred from frequent and relatively small price changes. Unfortunately, 
the size and frequency of price adjustments observed in many studies vary
29 On the idiosyncratic results of empirical studies into price behaviour see also Gordon (1990), in 
particular pp. 1118-23.
39 Twelve theories of price rigidity were tested. It must be said, however, ihat many of those refer to 
real price rigidity.
Blinder's empirical study departs from the traditional research strategies largely adopted by 
economists and based on econometrics. For a description of the research strategy and criticism see 
Blinder (1991) and comments therein. An analogous research was carried out also across British 
companies by the Bank of England, see HaH et al. (1996).
34 See Blinder (1994). Different results were derived from the survey in UK, where menu costs, 
explicitly defined as physical costs of changing prices, did not receive much attention from the 
interviewees. Such findings, however, do not necessarily hold for a broadar interpretation of menu 
costs. See Hall etal. (1996).
32 The highest average score was 2.77, for the coordination failure theory.
33 A direct scrutiny of costly price adjustments is difficult A recent attempt to measure explicitly the 
magnitude of menu costs has however been made in Levy et al. (1997), where microeconomic data 
referred to five large U.S. supermarket chains are analysed. The findings display that (at least) in the 
U.S. retail supermarket industry: (i) fixed menu costs exist; (Ü) they are non-trivial (on average 0.70 
percent of total revenues); (iii) they do represent a barrier to price changes. A direct empirical 
investigation into the costs of changing price is carried out also by M. E. Slade. She estimated the type 
and magnitude of menu costs econometricaHy. The results support the idea of fixed menu costs; see 
Slade (1996b).
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enormously across goods and, what is more, across time for the same item. That is 
why empirical evidence is of little help to definitely decide in favour either of 
constant costs or of variable costs of changing nominal prices^.
The foregoing reveals the difficulty providing a concrete identification of the costs a 
firm is expected to incur in changing its nominal prices^®. It might be true that the 
solution of such identification problem does not have to worry (macro)theorists too 
much. As argued by Ball and Mankiw, «... a literal account of menu costs is not 
necessary for studying most issues in macroeconomics». Menu costs are just an 
allegory, a parable, «a convenient formalization that captures the fact that prices are 
not adjusted continuously». They represent an "as if" theoretical device; just like the 
fictitious Walrasian auctioneer®^. Yet any endeavour to peg the allegory to some 
concrete, plausible example is still widely thought of as being worthwhile®^
4. What are menu costs?
The puzzle arising from the empirical analysis on price rigidity leaves open the 
question whether menu costs are fixed or variable. A possible way to solve the 
dilemma is to try to figure out what fixed and variable costs, in turn, can look Hke in !
the real world economy. What follows is a critical overview of alternative |
suggestions made in order to «go beyond the parable». Though none of them proves j
to be completely convincing, lump-sum menu costs emerge as the ones that are far |
more consistent with traditional microeconomics®®.
Fixed, or administrative costs of changing nominal prices are, by definition, 
independent from the size of price adjustments. In the literature it is common to 
associate them with the physical costs of printing new catalogues or new price lists.
34 On indirect empirical support for fixed menu costs see, among others, Carlton (1986), Cecchetti 
(1986), Carlson (1992), Blinder (1994), Kashyap (1995). As for variable menu costs, see Rotemberg 
(1982b), Roberts (1992), Konieczny (1993), and Kashyap (1995).
35 See Blinder (1991) and Kashyap (1995), p. 262.
36 «It is no more appropriate to insist on an exact identification of menu costs than it is to demand the 
social security number of the Walrasian auctioneer». See Ball and Mankiw (1994), pp. 142-3.
37BIinder (1994), Kashyap (1995), Slade (1996b), and Levy et al. (1997) remark «the importance of 
assessing the empirical relevance of menu costs». Ball and Mankiw themselves recognise that «it is 
still interesting to go beyond the parable to better understand the foundations of nominal frictions». 
See Ball and Mankiw (1994), p. 143. See also Romer (19%).
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More general, with the costs of informing salesmen, dealers and customers about the 
new nominal prices. Nonetheless, this sort of costs has received little empirical 
support Kashyap (1995), for example, reveals that catalogues are issued much more 
frequently than prices are amended. Notably, some of the biggest United States mail­
order companies issue a number of new catalogues per year, whereas the price of 
their core business items remains unchanged for periods on average longer than 
twelve months. Were the physical costs of printing new catalogues the main obstacle 
to price flexibility, one would expect the issue of new catalogues to be highly related 
to the occurrence of price changes. In line w ith these results are those of Blinder 
(1994) and Levy e t al. (1997). The latter, in particular, show that the costs of printing 
new price tags account for less than six percent of the total costs incurred by U.S. 
retail supermarkets when prices are changed®^.
It seems more plausible to identify lump-sum menu costs with "managerial costs".
The process of gathering the relevant information as well as taking and 
implementing price decisions require time and attention^. Accordingly, frequent 
price revisions are costly in terms of managers' hours spent on determining whether 
the profit maximisation conditions are continuously met. As pointed out in Levy e t
a lls quantitative 1997 analysis, the more decentralised price change decisions are, the IIlarger should be the managerial costs^^. To take an example of a decentralisation of |
the price change process, consider a supermarket chain where store-level managers i
rather than a corporate management team are in charge of making price change 
decisions.
However realistic the identification of menu costs with informational costs and, in 
general, with the costs of managers' time, I am afraid that it may turn out to be less 
credible in the coming years. The massive computerisation and the introduction of 
new technology along with the easy access to on-line information, are likely to make
38 Notice that the bulk of theoretical models assumes fixed rather than variable menu costs.39 In Levy et al. (1997) the (fixed) costs of changing nominal prices are made up of different 
components.
40 See, Bah and Mankiw (1994) and Levy et al. (1997). Indirect empirical evidence of menu costs as 
«informational costs» has been found also by Hall etal. (1996).
44 See Levy etal. (1997), p. 808-9.
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automated pricing decisions more and more popular within the near future. With the 
consequence of making such "managerial costs" less and less relevant to nominal 
price rigidity^.
Price adjustment costs have been also regarded as implicit costs arising from 
unfavourable market reactions to nominal price movements, no matter whether 
upwards or downwards^. The argument underlying this view, which is commonly 
used for describing variable menu costs^, is that consumers dislike frequent price 
variations. Unfortunately, the above identification, if appealing at first sight, proves 
to be theoretically fragile. Let us see why. Buyers' aversion to price movements is 
commonly justified by information costs. The search for novel and up-dated 
information is costly. In so far as buyers behave rationally, a new information search 
has to be triggered only by real price movements^®. From a theoretical point of view, 
there is no reason for price-setters to fear a bad reaction of the demand-side, when 
nominal prices are adjusted in response to nominal shocks. The same argument holds 
also when implicit menu costs are explained by means of the theory of judging 
quality by price^. It is the behaviour of relative (i.e., real) prices that rational 
consumers look at in order to evaluate the quality of a commodity*^.
The fatal flaw intrinsic to the justifications mentioned above is that sources of real 
price rigidity are used to describe the implicit costs of nominal price adjustments. To 
the extent one aspires to interpret the parable of menu costs as buyers' dislike of 
price movements, he/she needs to account for consumers' attention to nominal 
magnitudes. To this end, the following observation seems promising^. In the real
42 See also Kishyap (1995), p. 269.
43 Costly price adjustments are symmetric, which is independent from the sign of price movements.
44 See Rotemberg (1982a) and Konieczny (1993), where buyers are said to dislike large price changes.
45 According to the canonical economic theory, rational agents care only about real magnitudes. In a 
non-auction market, where (fairly) homogeneous goods are traded in different places (e.g., different 
retailers), it takes time to search for the "best" real price. So, information costs may represent a barrier 
to rea/price flexibility. The role of information costs within the economic system was first studied by 
Stigler (1961).
46 The idea of prices as a quality index dates back to the work of Scitovs(z)ky (1943-45). In late 1980s 
this topic experienced a revival mainly due to the fortune of the theory of imperfect and asymmetric 
information. See Blinder (1994), p. 144-7 and references therein.
^  Notice, however, that empirical evidence does not support the theory. See Blinder (1994) and Hall et 
al. (1996).
48 See Romer (1993).
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world economy prices are expressed in nominal rather than in real terms. If some 
sort of administrative costs prevent them from being continually adjusted, 
individuals may be led to attach significance to money prices. Using D. Romer's 
words, «an unchanged nominal price [...] may come to be viewed as the norm». The 
result is that sources that, by themselves, do not constitute barriers to nominal price 
adjustments (e.g., information costs) end up to be partly associated w ith changes in 
nominal prices. «Nominal rigidity may therefore be both stronger and more 
complicated than it would be if [fixed] menu costs alone were the only frictions»^^.
An elegant account of why nominal prices matter can be derived also by combining 
the Akerlof and YeUen's idea of "near rationality" with the so called price point 
theory. As everyone can experience in h is/her every day life prices are usually 
quoted as if some special thresholds exist Kashyap (1995), for example, pointed out 
that dollar prices are much more likely to end between 40 to 51 cents or between 75 
to 00 cents, than between 01 to 40 and 51 to 74 cents®°. This fact may be captured by 
assuming that consumers are near rational. Here, by near rationality I mean that 
consumers discriminate between different money prices (in absolute terms), even 
though they do not suffer from monetary illusion. Put differently, they «use rules of 
thumb when searching for items and comparing prices»® .^ As a result, nominal prices 
w ithin these thresholds tend to be less sensitive to nominal disturbances.
Despite the empirical accreditation of the near rationality hypothesis, the attempt to 
provide a conceivable justification for implicit menu costs®  ^risks being accused of 
internal inconsistency. Recall that costly price adjustments are intended for 
reconciling the "fuU rationality" postulate w ith nominal rigidity and money non­
neutrality. Arguing that this type of nominal friction emerges from a near rational 
behaviour it can be seen as a contradiction to the declared intention. More in general, 
if menu costs proved to be the allegory of rules-of-thumb behaviour, the New
49 See Romer (1993), p. 18.
50 For empirical evidence of price point theory see also Blinder (1994) and references in Kashyap 
(1995).
54 See Kashyap (1995), p. 266.
52 Notice that price point theory seems suitable for an explanation of upwards nominal rigidity, only. 
The corresponding menu costs, therefore, turn out to be asymmetric.
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Keynesian research program would turn into a partial failure and the label "New" 
should be dropped.
To sum up, the transposition of the theoretical device of menu cost into concrete and 
plausible forms is far from straightforward. Especially as regards variable menu 
costs. The analogy of costly price adjustments with the black holes in astrophysics 
seems therefore appropriate: they must exist, but none as yet can exactly say what 
they look like.
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The prevailing literature on the costs of adjusting nominal prices focuses on 
the behaviour either of monopolists or of monopolistic competitors. Strategic 
interaction between price-setters is therefore ignored. The rare attempts to analyse 
menu costs within a game-theoretic setting appear to have underestimated the 
theoretical relevance of menu costs. This chapter presents a theoretical study that can 
contribute to fill the gap. Section 1 briefly introduces the issue. In Section 2, a 
Bertrand duopoly model w ith menu costs is set up in order to derive the duopolists" 
best response to a nominal shock. To start with, a generic demand structure for each 
duopolist is considered (Section 2.1). It will be shown that firm-specific nominal price 
rigidity can occur even when menu costs are set equal to zero. A specific functional 
form is chosen in Section 2.2. The main findings are expounded in Section 3 where 
the cases of zero and of strictly positive menu costs are in turn outlined (Section 3.1 
and 3.2, respectively). A duopoly nominal price adjustment rule will be derived. This 
turns out to be asymmetric, i.e., contingent to the sign of the nominal shock. 
Situations of multiple equilibria, both symmetric and asymmetric, can also arise.
1. Introduction
The costs of adjusting nominal prices (whatever they look like concretely) were 
shown in the previous chapters to provide a theoretical justification for nominal price 
rigidity and, accordingly, for the breakdown of the classical dichotomy. Taking this 
as a landmark, I analyse here the relation between menu costs and market structures. 
Notably, the relation between menu costs and (different types of) oligopoly markets. 
As pointed out earlier^, the microeconomic literature includes some recent 
contributions where menu costs are analysed within a strategically interactive 
setting^. Nonetheless, these neglect to distinguish between nominal and real
1 See Chapter three.
- In Blanchard and Fischer (1989) as well, a simple Bertrand duopoly model with menu costs is briefly 
outlined at the end of Chapter 8 , within the Section "Problems". The authors refer to Caminal (1987).
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magnitudes. Moreover, nothing is said about the nature of the shocks. Yet, the 
distinction is not at all trivial. Nominal shocks, in fact, have real effects only in case of 
sluggish nominal adjustments. Whereas real disturbances have always real effects, 
irrespective of whether nominal prices are rigid or not. Accordingly, the presence of 
nominal friction, such as menu costs, seems to be far more crucial within a 
framework where monetary rather than real shocks are considered.
To preserve the theoretical relevance of menu costs I shall set up a model where real 
and monetary variables are clearly identified. Besides, I shall explicitly consider 
nominal disturbances. So, alterations of the state of the nature are due exclusively to 
nominally-based shocks. Real shocks are ruled out. In line w ith the established 
economic theory, nominal movements have real effects only if monetary prices turn 
out to be sticky.
2. A Bertrand duopoly model w ith menu costs
My aim is to investigate how (different degrees of) strategic interaction can affect- 
rational price-setters" decisions about whether or not to adjust their nominal prices in 
response to a one-off nominal shock, when nominal price adjustments are costly. To 
this end, I consider a symmetric Bertrand duopoly with differentiated non-storable 
goods. Prices are simultaneously set in advance of trade and must be quoted in 
monetary terms. If either firm alters its quoted nominal price, it will incur a fixed 
menu cost, z (with z>0). Both firms are supposed to be able to supply whatever 
quantity consumers demand when exchange takes place^ (i.e., there are no capacity 
constraints). I also assume that all industries but the one under study are perfectly 
competitive. Such assumption has been added as to ensure that the real effects of 
money stem exclusively from duopolists' behaviour and not from nominal rigidities 
within other markets.
Caminal (1987)'s aim is, among other, to derive a real price adjustment rule within a tow-period 
duopoly game with asymmetric information.
With respect to the point above, I am very grateful to Prof. Stefano Torri, who suggested me the key 
elements of Caminal (1987) and provided me with the necessary information.
) Quantity adjustments are supposed to be costless. As mentioned in chapter two, costly quantity 
adjustments with menu costs are considered, among others, in Andersen (1994) and (1995) and in 
Lucke (1995). Costly quantity adjustments alone are treated in Ginsburg et al. (1991).
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2.1 A non-linear demand structure
To start with, I consider the general case where no specific functional form is used to 
represent each duopolist"s demand schedule, which, therefore, is written as:
(1) 4 q. {p., p. ) with i ^  j  and i = 1,2 ,
where qi,pi and qj,Pj are the quantity demanded and the real price of good i and;,
respectively; dqjdpi is assumed to be negative, whereas the sign of dq^jdpj depends
upon the nature of the goods. A positive (negative) dqjdpj  implies goods are
substitutes (complements). The absolute value of dq.jdpj measures the cross-price
effects^. I shall take it as an index of the degree of strategic interaction within the 
market.
Notice that the above demand function is expressed in real terms. It depends, in fact, 
on real prices. Letting N  denote some exogenous nominal scale variable (henceforth 
nominal magnitudes are indicated by capital letters), nominal prices are defined as 
follows:
(2) P,=f{p„N);
equation (2) simply says that monetary prices' quotation depends both upon the 
"underlying" real prices as well as upon some relevant monetary index^. For 
simplicity, equation (2) can be specified as follows:
(2a) P,=Np, <=> P,
It is straightforward to see from (2a) that changes in the nominal scale variable, N, 
can affect the real price, p.,  and, consequently, each duopolist"s demand function
only if the nominal price, P^ , is rigid. Otherwise, if fully and promptly adjusts to
changes in N, the «classical dichotomy» between nominal and real variables will
4 It is worth noticing that demand depends only on current real prices charged by the firms. Thus, 
consumers' speculation about future prices is ruled out. The function in (1) is supposed to be twice- 
continuously differentiable within the bounded region in price space where dememds are positive.
5 It makes sense to set y | < \dq^ / dp,, j.
 ^In a more general setting, any nominal variable relevant for the "monetary side" of the economy.
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hold^. As for the meaning of N, it can be interpreted as an exchange rate that allows 
to convert real magnitudes into nominal terms. Within a partial-equilibrium analysis, 
carried out here, the nominal scale variable can be thought of as the inflation rate or 
the level of nominal GNP. In case of a general equilibrium analysis, N  can be any 
index related to the money stock, exogenously determined.
Each firm's average/marginal costs are assumed to be constant. Thus, firm i's (real) 
production costs can be written as:
(3)
For simplicity, k is normalized to zero^.
The industry is assumed to be initially at its Bertrand-Nash (B-N) equilibrium 
configuration, which is given by the intersection of each duopolist's best-response 
functions. In order to ensure that these (i) intersect and (ii) the intersection point is 
unique the following inequality must hold^:
d^TrJdp^ + ^ ^ j d p f i p <0 V [pi,pj) such that g,. > 0 ; (z = 1,2;?^  j  ), 
where is the firm fs  profit.
The initial symmetric equilibrium values of each duopolist's output, real price, and 
profit are denoted, respectively, as follows:
q r ,  p r  and
These magnitudes are in real terms. In line w ith the menu-cost literature, however, I 
have assumed that at the moment of price quotation (time 0) each firm announces its 
profit maximising price in nominal terms. The optimal nominal price corresponding 
to the initial B-N equilibrium is given by the following pricing rule^°:
(4)
7 In the absence of any type of nominal rigidity, equation (2) turns out to be homogeneous of degree 1 
in the nominal variable N.
8 This simplification does not affect the conclusions, as k  is time invariant in this model. Since all 
markets but the one under analysis are supposed to be perfectly competitive, nominal input prices are 
fully flexible.
Some minor implications of non-zero marginal costs are discussed in Appendix, at the end of the 
Chapter.
 ^Details and references are in Singh and Vives (1984), p. 552.
The case of indexed nominal prices is ruled out, like in Mankiw (1985). See Chapter two for more 
details.
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where  ^ is the ex-ante nominal profit maximising price; is the "underlying"
optimal real price, and denotes firms' expectations about the nominal scale 
variable's value at the moment of exchange (time t). Since firms are identical and 
there is no reason to suppose asymmetric information about future realisations of N , 
is the same for both firms.
2.2 The simultaneous decision problem
At the time trade takes place, if turns out to be incorrect {N^ ), namely if a
nominal shock has occurred, all firms have to decide simultaneously as whether to 
adjust (action A) their previously quoted nominal price, q pJ^^ , in response to the 
monetary shock, or not to adjust it (action R). Once the decision is taken, it is 
irreversible and becomes public knowledge.
By choosing (A), the firm incurs a menu cost, z, and can set its nominal price 
optimally again^k By choosing (R), the firm does not pay the menu costs and keeps 
its previously quoted nominal price fixed, i.e., rigid (hence the R to indicate non­
adjustment). In this case, the underlying real price, , will be:
pB E R  y
(5) p^^^ = ------- ; or, equivalently, ~ p^^^S, where S -  •
Notice that ô , which is always strictly positive, can be viewed as an indirect measure 
of the nominal shock. For S  larger (smaller) than unity, then N" >N^ (W  <#,). 
Thus, the nominal shock is negative (positive), such as an unexpected money 
contraction (expansion). From (5) it is straightforward to see that:
>
(6) 1 **  p
<
To illustrate the simultaneous decision problem outlined above, consider the 
following 2x2 payoff matrix (Figure 1), where rows refer to firm I's  decisions and 
columns to firm 2 's.
It means the firm can stay on its best-response function.
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Firm 2
Adjustment (A) Rigidity (R)
F irm l Adjustment (A) 
Rigidity (R)
- z  ; - z -  z ;
Figure 1: decision problem and payoffs
(A,A) and (R,R) cells correspond to the case of symmetric behaviour (i.e., firms take 
the same decisions). (A,R) and (R,A) cells correspond to the case of asymmetric 
behaviour.
(i) In (A,A) cell, both firms pay the menu costs and adjust their quoted nominal 
prices. Consequently, the nominal shock is "neutralised". The initial 
equilibrium configuration (in real terms) does not change. Each duopolist's 
payoff is -  z , (notice that is equal to ).
(ii) In (R,R) cell, neither firms incur the menu costs and monetary prices are kept 
fixed. Under such circumstances, nominal price rigidity is total. Each 
duopolist's payoff is trf'^ .
(iii) In (A,R) celh^, one firm pays the menu costs and can set its nominal price 
optimally, given its rival's decision. The other, instead, does not pay the menu 
costs and keeps its nominal price fixed. Nominal rigidity is therefore partial. 
The payoff of the adjusting firm -  z . Tire payoff of the non-adjusting firm
is .
According to the definition of B-N equilibrium, it is straightforward to establish 
that^^:
(7) (A, A) is a B-N equilibrium when: >z <=> > z ;
(8) (R,R) is a B-N equilibrium when: <z A ; r f < z ;
The same holds for (R,A) cell, mutatis mutandis. 
Details in Appendix at the end of the Chapter.
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For definition, ) is firm i’s best response (i.e. firm i's profit maximising price) to its rival's
1 , RIGprice level, p  y .
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(9) (A,R) is a B-N equilibrium when: A ; r f < z < .
(First superscripts refer to firm i's actions).
A ^ f c a n  be thought of as firm i's cost of rigidity, when firm /  adjusts; whereas 
A ; r f a s  firm i's cost of rigidity, when firm; keeps its price fixed.
A close examination of and reveals that:
= ^ , { p , { p r } p r y
Given the information above, firm i's costs of rigidity, when the rival chooses in turn 
to adjust and not to adjust its nominal price can be written as follows
= ,^{pr,pry ^ <{pr.pjiprl 
= :^{p,{pr\pr)- dpr>pr)-
According to the above expressions, it can be said that is always positive^^;
whereas the sign of A/r^ '^  cannot be a priori determined. It may be positive, as well as 
negative. This result proves to be particularly interesting. It suggests that, at least in 
principle, even with zero menu costs firm-specific nominal price rigidity can arise.
Consider conditions (7)-(9). Setting z equal to zero, inequality in (8 ) is never met. 
Consequently, (R,R), i.e., total nominal price rigidity, cannot be a B-N equilibrium i
outcome under the assumption of zero menu costs. Now, for a positive A)rf , (A,A) I
represents the B-N equilibrium. But, if A;rf’^  turns out to be negative, inequality in
(7) will be no longer satisfied. As a result, condition (9) will be met and partial I#nominal price rigidity, i.e. (A,R) and /o r (R,A) will be the optimal duopolists' t
response to the monetary shock. Despite the absence of "physical" nominal barriers I
there may be some strategically interactive price-setters who prefer to keep their |
monetary prices fixed. This result clearly depends on the fact that the private cost of
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rigidity, can be negative. In this regard, it is worthwhile remarking that
neither in monopoly nor in monopolistic competition the private cost of rigidity is 
negative's That is why within this class of imperfectly competitive markets menu 
costs (i.e., the cost of flexibility) must be strictly positive for firm-specific nominal 
stickiness to be privately optimal. I shall revert to this point later.
Since further insights can hardly be gained from the general treatment, an explicit 
functional representation of <?/(/?,-,Py) must be chosen. Notably, a linear demand
function will be considered. It allows to present my findings in an effective and easily 
understandable fashion.
2.2 A linear demand structure
Each duopolist's demand schedule is assumed to be a linear function in real prices, 
p. and p j . Thus,
(10) q.=a-~ /3p^  + rjpy with i ^  j  and i, j  - 1,2
where a  and /3 are positive constants, while the sign of rj depends on the nature of 
the goods^^. The cross-price effects is here measured by the absolute value of 7 ^^ , 
which, therefore, is taken as a measure of the degree of strategic interaction. In 
particular, for 7  = 0 (i.e., zero cross-price effects) each firm behaves as a monopolist. 
Each duopolist's reaction curves reads:
/ \ a + m ,PiipjJ^ _ / with i ^ J  and i = l,2.L p
Consequently, the initial B-N equilibrium configuration is:
( ^ b e r  b e r \ {  ^  .I?, .A a =
From each duopolist's demand function and reaction curve, it can be derived^^ that:
See, among others, Weiss and Sheshinski (1977), Mankiw (1985), Ball and Romer (1989, 1990). See 
also Chapter two.
16 For 7  strictly larger (smaller) than zero goods are substitutes (complements).
1^  Notice that [ 7 j < .
18 Details in Appendix, at the end of the Chapter.
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l + ( l - J ) HP.
1 - IL2 /^ (1-J)
Ô.
Now, substituting the above expressions into (7)-(8), the conditions according to 
which (A,A), (R,R), and (A,R) represent, in turn, a B-N equilibrium become:
(7a) (A,A):
^b) (RJ^:
1- J 1 - rj2
1 - IL <z;
>z;
(9a) (A,R): l - â - 1 < 1 - IL2 /?.
Being the payoffs state-contingent, the above conditions depend on:
(i) the sign and size of nominal disturbance, indirectly identified by â  values;
(ii) the relative size of menu costs, z;
(iii) the market features (i.e., type of goods and degree of strategic interaction),
embodied both in the sign and in the absolute value of 7 .
The LHS expressions in (7a) and (8a) are notliing else but and ,
respectively. As pointed out earlier, the former can be either positive or negative; the 
latter, instead, is always larger than zero.
Treating 7  as a fixed parameter, the menu cost z can be expressed as a fraction X of 
(with 0 </l<l) .
3. The results
In order to determine the solutions of the game-theoretic problem outlined in the 
previous section we need to study inequalities in (7a) and (8 a). Condition (9a), in fact.
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is simply the reverse of conditions (7a) and (8 a). Treating rj and as parameters, 
inequality in (7a) is satisfied for 
(10)19 and ^ >14-^ ;% ,
where
1
1
As for inequality in (8 a), it is met for
(11)20 and +
where:
Inspection of (10) and (11) allows to draw the following conclusions.
3.1 Zero menu costs and firm-specific nominal price rigidity
Setting Â (i.e., the menu cost) equal to zero yields
2 p ^ - r f
Given the above values, according to (10) and (11), it turns out that:
♦ (A,A) is a B-N equilibrium outcome, i.e. both duopolists adjust their nominal
prices, in case of positive shocks (i.e., S < l )  and in case of relatively large
negative shocks, namely S > \-¥
19 The results are not symmetric around one.
20 For S = \ there is no shock. So, the decision problem would not rise.
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(A,R) or (R,A), i.e. asymmetric price adjustments, are an equilibrium
T}~outcome for relatively small negative shocks (namely, for < 1 + 2^ 2 - 7 :
condition (9a) is met);
♦ (R,R) is never a B-N equilibrium outcome, i.e., condition (8 a) is never met.
Tf'Notice that    is increasing in (the absolute value of) 7 . Thus, as the degree of
strategic interaction between price-setters goes up, the range of negative shocks for 
wliich asymmetric behaviour represents an equilibrium response rises.
This result suggests that the assertion that «imperfect competition, [...], does not in 
itself cause any nominal rigidities»^^ is not necessarily true. Strategic interaction can 
in and of itself generates firm-specific nominal price rigidity and, consequently, leads 
to failure of the classical dichotomy^^ A graphical intuition of the result is given in 
the Appendix, at the end of the Chapter.
3.2 Symmetric and asymmetric m ultiple equilibria
Multiple equilibria, both symmetric^^ and asymmetric, can arise. With respect to this 
point, notice that the LHS expressions in (7a) and (8 a), which I shall denote by 
and , respectively, are the equations of two convex parables. Symmetric
(asymmetric) multiple equilibria possibly arise when parable (7a) is above (below) 
parable (8 a), i.e., A/rf'^ > A?rf'  ^ {A/rf''^ < A;rf'^ ). The comparison of the two parables 
yields
24 See Andersen (1994), p. 43.
22 Hansen et al. (1996) draw similar conclusions as regards real (rather than nominal) prices. 
Specifically, they show that asymmetric adjustments in real prices may represent the equilibrium 
response of strategically interactive price-setters to (small) negative real shocks. Notice, however, that 
Hansen et al. (1996) findings do not imply the failure of the classical dichotomy. By definition, the 
classical dichotomy breaks down when nominal movements (i.e., nominal shocks) affect real 
magnitudes. As a matter of logic (because of the zero-degree homogeneity property in nominal 
variables held by individual demand and supply functions), for money to have real effects, nominal 
rather than real price rigidity is needed.
23 Symmetric multiple equilibria are found out to occur also within monopolistically competitive 
markets. See Ball and Romer (1990); see also Chapter two.
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for n > 0 :  Aitf''' > A Æ ' f if â <1 and A > 1 H---- ——  ;'  ' 4 ^ - 3 7
for 7  < 0  : > A^ r" ' if 1 -----------, . < S < 1 .4^+ 3 |t|
The results are contingent to the nature of the goods.
i. For substitute goods:
♦ symmetric multiple equilibria can occur for positive nominal shocks (i.e.,
2t7< 1) and in case of large negative shocks (i.e., S >  1 + - -^  -  ).
Consequently, asymmetric multiple equilibria can arise only for
A < 1 + 2 ?4^-3?
2t)Notice that is increasing in rj. Tlius, as the degree of strategic interaction
between price-setters goes upwards, the possibility of symmetric (asymmetric) 
multiple equilibria to occur with negative shocks becomes lower (higher), ceteris 
paribus.
ii. For complement goods:
♦ symmetric multiple equilibria can arise only in case of relatively small
positive shocks (i.e., 1 - W—- < J < 1 ). Asymmetric multiple equilibria 
possibly arise in case of negative shocks and for large positive shocks, (i.e., 
S < 1 -----4/7 + 3|T
Since . is increasing in (the absolute value of) the chance for having
symmetric (asymmetric) multiple equilibria with positive shocks rises (decreases) 
when the degree of strategic interaction between price-setters goes upwards, ceteris 
paribus.
iii. For 7  equal to zero:
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♦ if strategic interaction between price-setters is absent and each behaves as a 
monopolist, situations of multiple equilibria, either symmetric or 
asymmetric, w ill disappear. Thus, the model generates Maiikiw's (1985) as a 
special case.
Findings in points (i) and (ii) imply that
a) asymmetric multiple equilibria (i.e., asymmetric nominal price adjustments) are 
more likely to occur when goods are complement rather than substitute, 
irrespective of the absolute value taken by 7 . The reverse applies to symmetric 
multiple equilibria. Such result evokes the idea of "strategic complementarity" 
and "strategic substitutability" in real price movements for substitute and 
complement products, respectively.
b) Duopoly norninal price adjustments can differ according to whether the 
disturbances are positive or negative. Notably, for substitute goods, asymmetric 
adjustments, (A,R) and (R,A), are an equilibrium response exclusively to negative 
shocks. When disturbances are of opposite sign, duopoly price-setters behave 
symmetrically. Either both adjust their nominal prices, or both keep them fixed.
In order to put all the foregoing results together and to highlight the main features of 
the "duopoly nominal price adjustment rule", inequalities (7a) and (8 a) have been 
plotted in the ( à, Â)  space. Figures 2 and 3, have been drawn for 7  = +0.5 and 
7  = -0 .5 , respectively, and for - I .
(FIGURE 2 and 3 at the end of the chapter).
3.3 Negative shocks and asymmetric price adjustments
In the previous section it has been found out that asymmetric equilibria can arise 
(mainly) w hen shocks are negative. In case of positive shocks, price-setters' 
adjustment decisions are (very likely to be) symmetric. It implies that the price 
adjustment rule is contingent to the sign of nominal disturbances. The rationale 
behind such finding can be grasped as follows. Suppose that firm j  pays the menu 
cost and adjusts its nominal price. The choice for firm i is between (R,A) and (A,A). 
Firm i w ill prefer the former to the latter outcome, i.e., (R,A) will turn out to be a B-N
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equilibrium, if the private cost of rigidity, , is smaller than the cost
of flexibility, z . As pointed out earlier, when shocks are positive is always 
strictly larger than Æ/"'", (irrespective of the type of goods). As a result, z must be 
relatively large for firm i to choose (R,A). Notice, however, tliat the higher the menu 
costs, the lower the rival's incentive to choose (A), It turns out that asymmetric 
behaviours can hardly be B-N equilibrium outcomes. Each duopolist's best responses 
to a positive shock (tend to) mirror h is/her rival's decisions and multiple symmetric 
equilibria possibly arise. On the contrary, at the occurrence of negative disturbances, 
/r/’'' may be smaller than If so, it implies a private gain from rigidity.
Consequently, relatively large menu costs are not needed for firm i to choose (R). 
Strategically stable asymmetric equilibria can, therefore, arise.
4. Conclusions
In a Bertrand differentiated-good duopoly the price-setters optimal pricing responses 
to a single nominal shock have been derived. The nominal price adjustment rule 
turns out to be much more sophisticated than the one within a market where 
strategic interaction is absent. In particular;
i) nominal price adjustments vary according to the sign of the nominal shock;
ii) symmetric as well as asymmetric multiple equilibria may occur;
iii) "physical nominal barriers" (such as menu costs) may not be necessary for 
nominal rigidity to arise.
These results depend not just on the sign and size of nominal shock and on the 
relative size of menu costs, but also on the market features, notably on the degree of 
strategic interaction between price-setters.
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Appendix to Chapter 4
1. Some minor implications of non-zero marginal costs
The main results of the model are fully unaffected by the zero marginal cost 
simplification. However, it may be interesting to examine what happens if non-zero 
marginal costs are considered. We shall focus particularly on the case of positive 
shocks. Under such circumstances, nominal price rigidity implies a contraction in 
the underlying real prices. The larger the positive shock, the stronger the real price 
contraction. At least in principle, it might also occur that real prices turn out to be 
below the marginal costs. Under a similar scenario, nominal price rigidity would 
arise as a Nash equilibrium only in case of relatively high menu cost.
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2. Derivation of (7)-(9)
To derive condition (7)-(9) consider the following.
a) Under the circumstances firm j  is adjusting her nominal price, firm i will choose 
(A,A) as an equilibrium strategy if - z > . Otherwise, firm f  will choose 
(R,A).
b) Under the circumstances firm j  is not adjusting her nominal price, firm i will 
choose (R,R) as an equilibrium strategy if -  z . Otherwise, firm i will 
opt for (A,R).
Because of symmetry, . Besides, the above holds for firm ;, mutatis
mutandis.
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3. Derivation of (7a)-(9a)
Firm i's reaction function reads
Pi{pj)= 
Accordingly,
2j0 i = 1,2 ; ^  j .
[ c i r , p r ) - or
In case of (A,A), i.e., both firms adjust, the classical dichotomy will hold. So 
In case of (R,R):
and
1 + 1 A. ( 1 - 4
in case of (A,R):
and pf'^ -  pf'"^
in case of (R,A):
1 + 1 - 2/?" (I-J) and pf''^ = épf '' .^
Using the above information, it is straightforward to establish that
(I) t r r ^ t r , { p r , P r ) = ’rf‘
(II) +■" = /r, {p, {pf° } p f  ) = irf
(III) t r f - '^^ f t , (p r ,p j (p f° ) )  = A
1 + A )
, 9
2 f i
r
( l~^)
( 1 - 4
J ;
1 + 1 - (1 -4 Ô.
Given (I)-(III), it is straightforward to derive conditions (7a)-(9a).
93
Chapter 4: M enu costs and strategic interaction
4. Graphical intuition of the (A,R) result in case of zero menu costs
As formally proved in Chapter 4, within a strategic interaction setting for (partial) 
nominal price rigidities to arise "physical" nominal barriers may not be needed. 
Notably, asymmetric adjustments, i.e. (A,R) or (R,A), can turn out to be a B-N 
equilibrium outcome, regardless the amount of menu costs. The graph below, which 
is drown considering substitute goods^^, may help to understand the reason. Let us 
consider the case firm /  responds to a negative shock by adjusting its nominal price 
(i.e., it remains on its best-response fimction). From firm i's perspective, the choice is 
between (A,A) and (R,A). As formally proved in Chapter 4 and shown by the Figure 
below, the sign of may be
negative. That is why firm i may opt for not adjusting its nominal prices even in the 
absence of menu costs^s.
Same conclusions hold for complement goods.
25 In the absence of menu costs, (R, R) outcome can not be a stable equilibrium, since each firm has an 
incentive to deviate from it and to stay on its best-response function. From this perspective, menu 
costs may be viewed as some type of "collusive" cost (i.e., costs to grant a stable collusion).
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